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ABSTRACT 
 TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND STRUCTURAL REALISM 
Sarı, Burcu 
MIR, Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Serdar Güner 
July 2003 
This thesis aims to analyze the concept of terrorism under the impact of 
international structure. For that purpose, first, the concept of terrorism is 
compared with other types of violence and its common characteristics were 
defined.  Second, terrorism is classified and historical examples were given 
accordingly. Third, terrorist organizations were assessed as smart mechanisms 
that are able to learn and adapt into the conditions in which they subsist. Last, it 
is highlighted that in the development of terrorist organizations, besides their 
internal dynamics, states’ tendency to cheat plays a crucial role. Terrorist 
organizations make use of the feeling of uncertainty and grow stronger out of 
the states’ rivalry. In the end, they emerge as secondary actors. As units 
interacting in the international system, the behaviors of terrorist organizations 
are also shaped and shoved by the structure. They both affect and become 
subject to the impact of structure. The impacts of the new actor on the 
international system were evaluated according to the basic principles of 
Structural Realism. As a result, it is concluded that since structural factors plays 
a crucial role in the emergence of terrorism, as long as the structure endures, 
terrorism will also persist. Therefore, states should find ways to coexist with 
terrorism with the possible least hazard.  
 
Key words: International Relations, Terror, Transnational Terrorism, 
Terrorist Organizations, Structural Realism, System, Change, Structure, the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
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ÖZET 
 SINIRÖTESİ TERÖRİZM VE YAPISAL GERÇEKÇİLİK 
Sarı, Burcu 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Danışmanı: Yrd. Doç. Serdar Güner 
Temmuz 2003 
 
 
Bu tez çalışması terörizm olgusunu uluslararası yapının etkisi altında 
ıncelemeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu amaçla, ilk olarak, terörizm kavramı diğer şiddet 
çeşitleriyle karşılaştırılmış ve bu kavramın taşıdığı temel özellikler tesbit 
edilmiştir. İkinci olarak, terrizm kavramı sınıflandırılmış ve bu sınıflandırmaya 
uygun olarak tarihsel olarak örneklendirilmiştir. Üçüncü olarak, terörist 
organizasyonlar yaşadığı koşullara uyum sağlayan ve akıllı mekanizmalar 
olarak değerlendirilmiştir. Son olarak, terörist organizasyonların gelişiminde 
kendi iç dinamiklerinin yanısıra devletlerin aldatma temayülünün öneminin de 
altı çizilmiştir. Terörist organizasyonlar devletlerin rekabetlerinden ve sistemden 
kaynaklanan belirsizlik duygusundan yararlanarak daha da güçlenmektedirler. 
Bunun sonucunda terörist organizasyonlar ikincil aktörler olarak ortaya 
çıkmıştır. Uluslararası yapıyla etkileşim halinde bulunan terörist 
organizasyonların davranışları yapı tarafından kısıtlanıp şekillendirilmektedir. Bu 
bağlamda, terörist organizasyonlar yapını hem öznesi hem de nesnesi 
olmuşlardır. Bu yeni aktörlerin uluslararası ilişkiler sistemi üzerindeki etkileri 
yapısal gerçekçilik teorisinin temel prensipleri temel alınarak değerlendirilmiştir. 
Yapısal faktörlerin terörizmin gelişiminde oynadığı önemli rol gözönüne alınarak 
yapı devam ettikçe terörizmin de varolacağı sonucuna varılmıştır. Dolayısıyla 
devletler terörizm ile mümkün olabilen en az zararı gözeterek birarada 
varolmanın gerektirdiklerini yapmalıdırlar.      
 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Sınırötesi Terör, Terörizm, 
Terörist Organizasyonlar, Yapısal Gerçekçilik, Sistem, Değişim, Yapı, Kitle İmha 
Silahları  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“Fighting terrorism is like being a goalkeeper. You 
can make a hundred brilliant saves but the only 
shot that people remember is the one that gets 
past you.” 
Paul Wilkinson1  
 
 
On September 11, 2001, the sole superpower of the international politics 
got past a shot that will never be forgotten. Whole world witnessed shocking 
and dreadful terrorist attacks live on the televisions. It was a scene that would 
be evaluated as an exaggeration, if it took place in a Hollywood production. 
Emotional and fearful ramifications of these attacks on the entire world were 
intangible. Besides the shock they stimulated, the assaults served as lessons 
for the world public that no one could escape being a victim of terrorism, even 
superpowers. A terrorist organization, claimed to be Al Qaeda, carried out such 
an operation that no state could dare against the US. These terrorist attacks on 
the US raised questions regarding the future security environment of the world. 
The fear and the sense of vulnerability and insecurity increased among states 
and their constituents. ‘Nothing will be the same again’ became almost a motto 
in the discussions of the academic circles and daily conversations in the period 
subsequent to the September 11 incidents. The amount of academic studies 
focusing on terrorism augmented. Many questions were asked beginning with 
‘Who’, ‘What’, ‘When’, ‘Where’, ‘How’ and ‘Why’ and tried to be answered.  
                                                 
1 Terrorism Quotes, Terrorism Quotations, Terrorism Sayings [on-line]. Available on 
http://home.att.net/~quotesexchange/terrorism.html; Internet. 
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In this thesis, terrorism, in general, and transnational terrorism, in 
particular, will be the main analytical focus and the research herein will pursue 
answers to such crucial questions as: What is terrorism? What should be our 
measurement while defining the term? Is it a distinct kind of violence? What are 
the features of terrorism that distinguish it from other types of violence? Is it 
possible to make a typology regarding terrorism? What historical examples can 
be given regarding these typologies? What are the continuities we faced while 
studying terrorism and what changes took place in its logic and the methods of 
violence? What are the factors that helped terrorism to become too outrageous? 
What are the internal and external dynamics of terrorism? Did terrorism really 
become an interacting unit in the system invalidating the importance of the 
states? What is the relationship between the international system and 
terrorism? What are the permissive factors in the international system assisting 
the development of terrorism? What were the features of the international 
system did play a role in strengthening of terrorism? Can we see any factor in 
the international system constituting underlying reason for the development of 
terrorism? What are the similarities or the differences that exist between 
terrorist organizations and the other actors in the system? Why do they act alike 
or in a different way? What changes can we foresee for the future security 
environment of the world under anarchy? Is it possible to get rid of terrorism? 
Some of these questions are going to be answered by empirical-
historical framework. Historical and empirical parts of the discussion will be 
utilized so as to establish the argument that transnational terrorism constitutes a 
peak point in the evolutionary process of terrorism and deserves special 
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attention from structural theories. In the descriptive parts of the thesis we will 
make a connection between the enriched capabilities of transnational terrorist    
organizations and states’ tendency to cheat. Therefore, the remaining inquiry 
will be held theoretically by using basic assumptions of Structural Realism.  This 
theoretical part, which is going to be the main focus of this thesis, aims to 
elaborate on the relationship between the international system and 
transnational terrorism. The impact of the international structure on 
transnational terrorism will be closely scrutinized. Structural Realism is a theory 
usually criticized for its ignorance of the changes and focusing on the 
continuities in the system. Here, we aim to analyze the changes and the 
continuities in the international system due to transnational terrorism by using 
Structural Realism as a theoretical framework.   
The second chapter of this study is going to focus on the definitional 
problem concept of terrorism. We will compare terrorism with classical warfare, 
guerrilla warfare, ordinary and political crimes in order to distinguish terrorism 
from other types of violence. Having an overlook to the other definitions, we will 
specify common tenets of terrorism and argue that an objective approach is 
necessary to reach a common definition of terrorism. Hence, we will define our 
position in favor of looking at the means used by terrorist organizations. 
Consistent with our position, we will prefer a definition used by Walter Enders 
and Todd Sandler and justify the reasons for this preference.  
In the following chapter, we will divide terrorism into sub-titles initially, 
according to the perpetrator of the act of terrorism as state and non-state 
terrorism. Later, we will make a further division of terrorist organizations as 
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domestic state terrorism and international state terrorism based on their target 
selections. We will also use same categorizations for non-state terrorism and 
classify it as domestic and transnational non-state terrorism. In order to provide 
a better understanding, historical examples are going to be given in detail. We 
will pursue historical trajectory of terrorist organizations and argue that 
transnational terrorism constitutes a peak point in the evolution process of 
terrorist organizations. 
In the fourth chapter, we will further our trajectory on the continuities in 
the logic of terrorism and the changes in its methods of violence with the future 
prospects and elaborate on the increased effectiveness of terrorism. Terrorism 
is going to be mentioned as an independent factor that is able to learn and 
adapt to the conditions of modernity. While discussing terrorists’ ability in 
adapting, we will highlight a fact that terrorist organizations are not irrational 
actors as it was assumed to be. We will emphasize that they are effective in 
making cost-benefit calculations and making preference orderings. As terrorist 
organizations want to kill more with the least cost, we will comment on the 
prospects of change in the methods of terrorism especially by the virtue of the 
weapons of mass destruction.  
In the fifth chapter, we will combine terrorism and structural realism in the 
same picture and discuss the relationship between the international system and 
terrorism. The emergence of the terrorist organizations as important actors in 
the field of security as adversaries of states in the system, their interactions with 
states and the structure, as well as, the impact of the structure on both terrorist 
organizations and states will be discussed. Later, the changes asserted by 
 5 
 
terrorist organizations on the composition of the system, the sameness principle 
of the units, and the distribution of the capabilities across the units will be 
studied.  
In the concluding part, we will make an overall evaluation and argue that 
terrorism is going to be endemic in the international system due to its anarchic 
composition. It is affirmed that transnational terrorist organizations were added 
as secondary actors in the international politics. This is evaluated as a change 
not because of their addition to the system as actors but due to the hole they 
opened in the positional picture in the international system.  We will argue that 
as terrorists and their capabilities are secret, states cannot calculate terrorist 
organizations juxtaposition with respect to themselves, which also increase 
states’ feeling of insecurity and lead the continuity of the anarchic structure. 
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CHAPTER II 
CONCEPT OF TERRORISM  
The literature on terrorism in international relations (IR) suffers from the 
lack of a commonly accepted definition of terrorism.2 The use of a hackneyed 
phrase such as ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter’ indicates 
the problem of clearly defining the term. Alex Schmid, a very prominent scholar 
in the field, states that ‘the question of defining of a term like terrorism cannot 
be detached from the question of who is the defining agency’.3 The definition of 
terrorism changes depending upon the political, philosophical or emotional 
situation of the definer.4 Defining agencies mostly focus on the perpetrator of 
the act of terrorism not on the characteristics of terrorists’ acts. To focus on 
perpetrator of terrorist act prevent academicians and researchers develop 
                                                 
2 The problem of definition includes academic debates on the subject, not the political reasons 
of states in avoiding to produce a common definition. To mention political reasons briefly in 
1980s, Third World countries does not cooperate with American and European efforts to identify 
and combat international terrorism since they see antiterrorist efforts as part of a broader 
campaign aimed at outlawing the irregular methods of warfare that are developed in the Third 
World during the war of liberations under the framework of decolonisation, and the irregular 
methods used by natives. Brian Jenkins, “Defense Against Terrorism,” Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 101, Issue: 5 (1986): 781. Also, Thackrah claims that in the international forum 
neither the Soviet bloc nor the most Third World countries would be likely to vote in favor of a 
definition geared to Western interest. The Soviet Union has an interest in trying to label all 
individuals and groups working against Western interests in a violent manner as ‘freedom 
fighter’s participating in the ‘wars of liberation, not in terrorist acts. As many third World 
countries achieved independence as the result an armed struggle, which typically began with 
terrorist acts, they do not want outlaw terrorism. Ronald Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional 
Problem, "in Contemporary Research On Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart 
(Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 1987), 32.  Aynur Ak claims that states tend to 
produce their own definition of terrorism that serves best to their national and political interest. 
Some governments avoid producing an accepted definition in order to be able to suppress 
internal and external oppositional groups. Some states refrain from a general definition because 
they do not want to be restricted with a general rule that would limit their sovereign rights. Aynur 
Ak, “Uluslararası Terörizm.” (Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Ankara University, 1995), 12-14. 
3 Donald J Hanle, Terrorism: The Newest Face of Warfare (Washington: Pergamon Press, 
1989), 104.  
4 Elegab states that no definition would be comprehensive enough to encompass all possible 
aspects of terrorism, which is so varied in its forms, motives, targets, and logistic backup. Omer 
Yousif Elagab, International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism (London: Cavendish Pub., 
1997), iv. 
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standard criteria for production of a single definition. To complicate matters 
further, there is a near consensus among scholars on the impossibility of 
avoidance from the subjectivity problem and impossibility of having a single 
definition of terrorism.5 
Due to the absence of a recognized definition of the term, the studies of 
terrorism mostly focus on the problem in historical and descriptive terms.6 
Naturally, without having a fixed definition, historical materials increase the 
confusion about the concept. In order to avoid the confusion and not to fall into 
subjectivity, we will consider terrorists’ means and we will attempt to distinguish 
terrorism from other forms of violence and to compose a general framework for 
terrorist actions. Looking at the components outline, we will prefer a 
parsimonious definition that is going to be helpful to cover varieties of 
terrorism.7 
 
2.1 Is ‘terrorism’ a type of warfare? 
It is a very commonly made assertion that terrorists regard themselves 
as freedom fighters. Many terrorist organizations select names including words 
like liberation and freedom. These organizations state that the real terrorists are 
                                                 
5 Paul Wilkinson, claims that it is naive to assume to find a value-free language for the study of 
terrorism. Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism: British perspectives (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993), xii. 
Walter Laqueur also is despaired of defining terrorism so, to him; it is not worthwhile to make 
the attempt for finding a definition. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 
1998), 39. Thackrah also claims that it is not possible to find an objective definition of terrorism. 
Ronald Thackrah, "Terrorism: A Definitional Problem, "in Contemporary Research On 
Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and A. M. Stewart (Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 
1987), 26. 
6 Laqueur states that terrorism cannot be generalized. Therefore, it should be studied as case 
studies including the political values of the researcher. Walter Laqueur, Terrorism (Boston: Little 
Brown, 1977), 32. 
7 We use this simple definition because it enables us to add particularities of varieties of 
terrorism and produce definitions for typologies of terrorism. 
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the social political system and its rules. In their fight against the strong, they 
justify their methods by claiming their numerical inferiority compared to the 
states’ national defense and security apparatus. In this regard, they make use 
of terrorism as the weapon of the weak against the strong oppressor. According 
to terrorists, states also kill innocent people and cause destruction while making 
war; hence, terrorists cannot be blamed of killing the innocent and making 
destruction in their ‘war against the oppressor’. Terrorists regard no difference 
between the violence they used and violence states assert.8 
Conversely, there are qualitative differences between types of terrorist 
violence and war. War can be defined as ‘a contest between two or more 
independent state carried on by the authority of their respective governments’.9  
Traditionally war is fought between armies, whose members carry out insignias 
                                                 
8 There are similarities between war and terrorism as well. According to Hanle, war has three 
component; political aim, moral plane and physical plane. As Clausewitz’s famous dictum ‘war is 
the continuation of politics with other means’, meaning that war is fought for a political purpose. 
The employment of force targets the moral plane of the adversary in order to harm its cohesion. 
Cohesion is a factor that can explain why small powers gain war against stronger adversaries. 
Moral and Sociological bounds create higher social organisms out of ordinary and weak mass. It 
is also important to determine whether the force employed is subject to the principles of combat 
that govern the manipulation of physical force against physical force in war. Therefore, if there is 
not an activity facing two physical forces, then we cannot claim a war among two. As terrorist 
has political purpose and mainly attack on the moral plane they can be regarded as war. Yet, it 
does not fulfill the third condition it cannot be evaluated as war in the end. Hanle claims that 
some types of terrorism can be form of warfare; such as state-supported terrorisms including 
international and transnational ones. See, Hanle, 35-52. Also, Everett L. Wheeler claims that 
terrorism can be a form of primitive warfare as in the ancient times when terror is used as a tool 
in the wars.  The author discusses its primitive character because the users of terrorism are not 
abide with the rules of was as primitive societies in ancient times.  See, Everett L. Wheeler, 
“Terrorism and Military Theory,” in Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed. Clark McCauley 
(London: Frank Cass, 1991), 13-14. The former approach regards the state involvement as the 
criterion for terrorism to be claimed as a type of warfare. The latter approach assumes the terror 
caused in the absence of rules regarding the use of violence as a criterion to distinguish 
between war and terrorism. Yet, if we consider contemporary terrorist organizations and their 
actions on their own merits, then we should accept that terrorism is a distinct kind of violence.   
9 http://www.lectlaw.com/def2/w038.htm, Clausewitz defines as such ‘War therefore is an act of 
violence to compel our opponent to fulfill our will’. Available from internet: 
http://www.clausewitz.com/CWZHOME/On_War/BK1ch01.html 
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defining their nationality. Terrorists, on the other hand, are not military branches 
of governments. They cannot be defined and on purpose, they conduct their 
operations in secrecy. In this regard, it is not possible to talk about a war 
between two parties.  
Moreover, soldiers or states are bound with the rules and accepted 
norms of behavior proscribing various tactics and the outlawing of attacks on 
specific categories of targets. Geneva and Hague Conventions prohibit 
regulations governing the treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers 
(POWs), outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs, recognize neutral 
territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states, and, uphold the inviolability 
of diplomats and other accredited representatives.10  
In history, there are instances in which states consciously violated the 
rules of war. However, such violations are defined as ‘war crimes’. Even though 
international and national measures against war crimes are inefficient and 
weak, the perpetrators of the war crimes are held responsible of their acts and 
condemned. It is true that soldiers might damage the innocent in a war but this 
does not transform soldiers into terrorists11 because soldiers do not intend to kill 
the innocent or civilians during war conditions.12 
Dissimilarly, terrorists intend to kill non-combatants. The deliberate killing 
of civilians is one of the prominent characteristics that discern terrorists from 
                                                 
10 Hoffman, 5. 
11 Hanle, 174. 
12 In military literature, civilian deaths are called ‘collateral damage’. 
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soldiers. Terrorists endeavor to create ‘fear’, ‘terror’13 among civilians by their 
indiscriminate selections of target. Terrorists do not regard themselves bound 
with any kind of moral rule and rules of war. The very nature of the international 
terrorist organizations is to reject such principles. Considering these, Brian 
Jenkins describes international terrorist organizations as the groups who 
disregard international norms, rules and laws. 14   
In few words, we can conclude that terrorist organizations are not armies 
of independent states respecting the international law and moral rules 
concerning the use of violence. They do not fight wars and they fight covertly. 
They target on military or civilians without any declaration.  Hence, as opposed 
to their own self-perceptions, they are not warriors but terrorists. 
 
2.2 Is ‘terrorism’ guerrilla warfare?  
The lack of an exact definition and consistent criteria for the term multiply 
the usage of terrorism. The term terrorism is very often used interchangeably 
with some other words such as insurrection, rebellion, civil strife and guerrilla 
warfare. The multiple use to the term especially increases, as states tend to 
label oppositional groups as terrorist usually because such a policy helps to 
produce immediate countermeasures. Nevertheless, among these terms, 
guerrilla warfare is mostly confused with terrorism.  
                                                 
13 The word of terror means intense and overpowering fear. The roots of the word go to Latin 
‘terror’ from ‘terrere’ and to old French ‘ terreur.’ Available from the internet.  
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=terror. 
14 Brian Jenkins, “International terrorism”, in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, eds.  Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 73. 
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Indeed, terrorism and guerrilla warfare share common characteristics. 
For instance, both concepts are characterized as being the weapons of the 
weak. Both are too cheap to conduct and too expensive to be protected against. 
They are also secret and unconventional ways to combat the opposed states’ 
forces. In addition, guerrillas often employ similar tactics with terrorists, such as 
assassination, kidnapping, bombings, and etc15. Moreover, guerrillas and 
terrorists do not wear uniform and carry any insignia that distinguishes them 
from the non-combatants.16 
Despite the fact that both groups are classified under the word of 
irregulars, there are fundamental differences between the two. The term of 
guerrilla warfare was originally used to ascribe military operations carried out by 
irregulars against the rear of an enemy or by local inhabitants against an 
occupying force.17 In guerrilla warfare, the weaker side assumes tactical 
offensive in selected forms, time, and place against its adversary, usually a 
foreign occupier.  
Paul Wilkinson states that guerrillas may be outnumbered and endowed 
with inadequate weaponry.18 However, they can and often do fight according to 
the conventions of war, taking and exchanging prisoners and respecting the 
rights of non-combatants.19 In another saying, internationally accepted rules of 
war apply in guerrilla wars. Either tactically or ethically, guerrilla leaders 
                                                 
15 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter, 
available on http://www.ict.org; Internet. 
16 Richard L. Clutterbuck, Terrorism and Guerrilla Warfare: Forecasts and Remedies (New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 9. 
17 Sean Anderson, Historical Dictionary of Terrorism (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1995), 
92. 
18 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter, 
available on http://www.ict.org; Internet. 
19 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism and the Liberal State (London: Macmillan, 1986), 71-80. 
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deliberately avoid attacking civilians. Pursuing such a policy, they aim at public 
support and avoid provoking severe governmental repressive actions.20  
Terrorists in contrast to guerrillas do not respect the rules of war and they 
do not take actions in the face of foreign occupation. They place no limit on the 
means they employ and frequently resort widespread killings. They aim at 
repressive governmental reactions by disregarding general rules of war. 
According to terrorists, repressive actions and governments policies would 
justify terrorist acts. In this regard, terrorism is a means intentionally used to 
create a severe reaction from victimized party. By its deliberate use, terrorist 
violence aspires to create impressions that ‘the terrorists may attack anytime on 
anybody, and anything’ and harm moral its counterpart. In another saying, 
unlike guerillas, aim of terrorist is psychological not material.  
Terrorism and guerrilla warfare are distinct at this point as well. Guerrilla 
warriors do not aim solely a psychological impact. They use violent methods in 
order to acquire a material goal. Walter Laqueur states that ‘the essence of the 
guerrilla war is to establish a liberated area in the country side and set up small 
military units which will gradually grow in strength, number and equipment to 
fight battles against government troops.21 In those liberated areas, the guerrillas 
establish their own institutions, conduct propaganda, and engage in political 
activities. They prefer the countryside, since such places provide geographical 
advantages to guerrillas over their enemies.  
                                                 
20 Wilkinson, “Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and Rule of Law,” 4-8. 
21  Laqueur, Terrorism, 102. 
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On the other hand, terrorists and guerillas differ in their location 
preferences. Terrorists make their preferences calculating the tactical 
advantage provided by location. Terrorist organizations do not attempt to seize 
and hold territory to sustain secrecy and safety. They do not aim to acquire a 
definite place. Terrorists chose cities because they provide advantages to 
terrorists.22They infiltrate easily in cities to conduct operations and cause a 
greater degree of terror and become able to create more publicity for their 
actions. Since terrorist actions undertaken in a city have a greater likelihood of 
causing severe damage (such as higher amount of death). Also, cities are 
places where terrorist actions can have more access to media, implying 
publicity for terrorists. 
It is claimed that almost all guerrilla movements make use of terrorism at 
one point or another during the stage of their developments or some solely rely 
on it alone.23 Common use of terrorist methods does not eliminate the 
fundamental difference among terrorist organizations and guerrilla groups. 
Terrorist organizations use violence to acquire a psychological impact while 
guerrillas use the same violence as a tool to acquire a physical or material 
target. While guerillas apply rules of war, terrorism is based on violation of these 
principle rules. Hence, it can be concluded that terrorism and guerilla warfare 
are distinct types of violence.   
                                                 
22 According to Jeffry Ian Ross, geographical locations are included in the permissive causes of 
terrorism. Permissive causes are endemic to all societies. They are necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for terrorism. Type of political system, and the level of modernization are the other 
permissive factors. See, Jeffrey Ian Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: 
Towards a Causal Model,” Journal of Peace Research, Volume 30, No: 3 (Aug., 1993): 320. 
23 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter, 
available on http://www.ict.org; Internet. 
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2.3 Is ‘terrorism’ an ordinary crime? 
It is argued that terrorism is a type of crime, which is a valid assessment. 
Yet, terrorism cannot be considered as an ordinary crime even though both use 
violence as a means to attain their aim.24 The use of violence for both have 
different aims or motivations, purpose and self-perception25, which differentiates 
them fundamentally. 
To begin with, criminals apply violence because they aim to obtain 
money, to acquire a good or a place. The aim of an ordinary criminal is usually 
personal and material. However, the use of violence serves multiple aims of 
terrorists. Terrorists simply use violence to inject terror. They strive to form a 
public opinion favorable to them. They take advantage of the same violence as 
an instrument to increase group cohesion. Additionally, they claim to use the 
violence as a means to change the ‘corrupt system’. In this regard, terrorists’ 
aims are not personal or material but organizational and psychological.  
Terrorists aim to give a political message by their actions.26 An ordinary 
criminal usually does not aim to give a political message unlike a terrorist. To kill 
a political leader for personal reasons is different from doing it to give political 
message to the rest of society. Also, unlike terrorists, criminals do not intend to 
create a fearful impact on society. They undertook their planned action for its 
                                                 
24 Kronenwetter claims that as the purpose of terrorists and ordinary criminals are different it is 
very important for the ones who want to fight against terrorism. As terrorists assume that they 
act for the benefit of the others, methods used for restricting criminals would not work for 
terrorists. Micheal Kronenwetter, The War On Terrorism, (Englewood Cliffs: Simon and 
Schuster, inc., 1986), 23-25. 
25 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 41-44. 
26 Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003), 
116. 
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own cause. While terrorists’ desire is to create an indirect impact upon the 
society, ordinary criminals do not have further purposes rather than their 
immediate actions. 
Individual political crimes and terrorist acts are also different. It is 
possible that a frustrated person kills a politician; however, this does not make 
one a terrorist. To qualify an act or a person as a terrorist, the observed 
violence should remind an organizational aspect. The organizational entity 
should have a structure and a chain of command creating the impression that a 
single individual did not act on his/her own will.27 
Lastly, terrorists and criminals have different self-perceptions. Terrorists 
usually regard themselves as those responsible or liable to mobilize the 
suffering members of society. Therefore, they call themselves freedom fighters, 
survivors, or national heroes. They assume themselves as survivors. As their 
action is going to end the existence of a harmful entity for the society, the 
terrorist act of destroying that entity is regarded as public good not as the 
realization of personal aim. However, an ordinary criminal knows that he or she 
is a murderer or a burglar and undertakes action for his or her personal aims. 
Unlike terrorists, ordinary criminals do not pretend a societal role for 
themselves.   
Concluding in few words, organizational and political aspects and self-
perceptions of terrorism are crucial factors that discern it from individual 
ordinary or political crimes. Terrorists claim a societal role for themselves and 
instrumentalise violence to ‘enlighten’ the rest of the society. Negatively, they 
                                                 
27 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43. 
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endeavor to install fear on their opposed audience. Terrorists acting as 
organized groups claiming societal responsibility make them much more 
complicated than ordinary criminals. To accept them as the same is the 
oversimplification of the matter. 
 
2.4 An Overlook to Other Definitions  
As an overall evaluation, we can infer that terrorism is a distinct type of 
violence. It is not warfare, guerilla war, and ordinary political crime.28 Despite 
most of the researchers in the field agree on its distinct character, this 
consensus did not help to produce a commonly accepted definition of terrorism. 
A prominent researcher and academician in the field of terrorism, Alex Schmid29 
conducted a study identifying more than a hundred different definitions of 
terrorism. These definitions include some common focus points. According to 
Schmid’s study, the frequently used terms for terrorism and their percentages 
are:  
• Violence, force (% 83.5) 
• Political (% 65)  
• Fear, terror emphasized (% 51) 
• Threat (% 47) 
• Effects (psychological) and (anticipated) reactions (% 41.5), 
• Victim-target differentiation (% 37.5) 
• Purposive, planned, systemic, organized action (% 32) 
• Method combat, strategy, tactic (% 30.5) 
• Extra-normality, in breach of accepted rules, without humanitarian constraints (% 
30) 
• Coercion, extortion, induction of compliance (% 28) 
• Publicity aspect (% 21.5) 
• Arbitrariness; impersonal, random character; indiscrimination (% 21) 
• Civilians, noncombatants, neutrals, outsiders as victims (% 17.5) 
• Intimidation (% 17) 
• Innocence of victims emphasized (% 15.5) 
                                                 
28Jenkins “Defense Against Terrorism,  780. 
29 Adrian Guelke, The Age of Terrorism and the International Political System (Newyork: Tauris 
Publishers, 1995), 19. 
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• Group, movement, organization as perpetrator (% 14) 
• Symbolic aspect, demonstration to others (% 13.5) 
• Incalculability, unpredictability, unexpectedness of occurrence of violence (% 9) 
• Clandestine, covert nature (% 9) 
• Repetitiveness; serial or campaign character of violence (% 7) 
• Criminal (% 6) 
• Demands made on third parties (% 4) 
 
 
Considering these frequently used terms in the other definitions of 
terrorism, we find it appropriate to use a definition offered by Walter Enders and 
Todd Sandler. According to them, terrorism is defined as ‘a premeditated use, 
or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political 
objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience’. 30 As 
discussed above, organizational aspect of terrorism is a crucial matter while 
dealing with terrorism. Yet, this definition does not specify the organizational 
aspect of the subject. While using this definition, we also connote the 
organizational aspect, including state and non-state perpetrators. 
The definition contains significant features of terrorist acts and aims to 
represent an objective approach to the act of terrorism. To begin with, it helps 
researchers to qualify the acts not according to the perpetrators or their aims 
but the means and the results of these acts. As discussed formerly, one of the 
crucial problems in the study of terrorism is to decide whether the ends of 
terrorists justify their means.31 Since the definition focuses on ‘the use of extra-
                                                 
30 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era,” 
International Studies Quarterly, Volume 43, (1999): 146-147. 
31 Brian Jenkins states that the ones arguing that no body who stands for a just cause is a 
terrorist further complicates the problem of definition. He asserts that if the cause is the criterion, 
only to the extent that everyone in the world can agree on the justice of a particular cause is 
there likely to be agreement that an action does or does not constitute terrorism. This led to the 
cliché that one ma’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter, which implies that there are no 
universal standards of conduct in conflict as opposed to the way it should have been in the 
civilized nations. See, Jenkins , Defense Against Terrorism,  779. 
 18 
 
normal violence’, researcher can define an act as terrorist by looking at the 
means only. Looking at the means only can help researchers to reach at least 
an agreement facilitating the development of a consistent framework to study 
terrorism. Otherwise, taking the ends of terrorists as measurement multiplies 
definitions as such an approach lead to subjectivity problem. 
Second, the definition provides researchers a necessary tool to 
distinguish terror caused by accidental incidents and intentional acts of 
terrorism. Fear created by terrorist act is an intentional result of it as opposed to 
fear caused by accidental cases. The premeditated use of violence is a 
purposive act undertaken so as to intimidate a large audience. Fear is the 
ultimate intended effect of terrorism. According to Brian Jenkins, terrorism is 
undertaken for its effect not on the actual victims but on the audience.32 
Terrorists, by means of fear they install, aim to create examples for the 
audience to create the sense of ‘I might also be a victim.’33 As terrorists cannot 
be identified easily, the sense of cohesion among the public becomes 
vulnerable. Also, as the society lacks the sense of security, the authority and 
legitimacy of governments become susceptible in the eyes of their citizens. 
Therefore, the fear caused by the decreased sense of security is not a by-
product of terrorism but an instrument for terrorists to reach their aims.  
Third, ‘political’ characteristic of terrorism differentiate terrorist acts from 
mere criminal acts. The use of the term ‘political’ implies that terrorism can have 
different objectives ranging from religious, ethnic, separatist, to ideological 
                                                 
32 Brian Jenkins says that terrorism is a theatre and it aims people watching. Brian Jenkins, 
“International Terrorism: The Other World War” in International Terrorism, Characteristics, 
Causes, Controls, ed. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ( London: Macmillan Education Press, 1990),  35. 
33 Hanle, 112. 
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issues. This feature has a very important impact on terrorists’ self-perceptions. 
Their positions as opposed to their target is defined according to their political 
standings. They justify their acts according to their political reasoning and try to 
manipulate their audience by using it. They claim that the purpose of their 
actions is to defend the political rights of minority exploited by the powerful. 
Hence, political character of terrorism is a very crucial element included in the 
definition.   
Also, the emphasis on the ‘use of extra-normal violence’ implies that 
terrorism violates normative values concerning employment of lethal force. 
Since Abel to Kabul, humans have adhered to certain feelings and rules, which 
affect how, why, and when they will apply the lethal force.34 The development of 
the rules of war illustrates the impact of feelings on the creation of law regarding 
the international use of force. The adherence to these rules and norms provides 
predictability, contributing to the sense of security. According to terrorists, the 
more the violence unpredictable, the greater the psychological impact upon the 
audience. The greater the psychological impact upon the target, the less the 
sense of security among the audience. Therefore, terrorists do not hesitate to 
use extra-normal violence and to violate any rules of war, if the violation serves 
their interest.35  
Lastly, the definition emphasizes that terrorists act to influence ‘a large 
audience’. We can presume that the audience may consist of civilian or military 
                                                 
34 In his famous work, 'Perpetual Peace’, Kant argues that in order to acquire peace; parties of 
conflict should be bound with some rules. For instance, parties should avoid holocaust or 
poisoning. Therefore, he discussed the necessity of the rules even in destructive activities of the 
mankind. Arıboğan, 173. 
35 Hanle, 106-107. 
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targets. Civilian targets are mostly focused while discussing brutality of terrorist 
incidents since they are held immune from intentional attacks conventionally. 
Terrorists prefer attacking on civilians because it provides a greater 
psychological impact upon the audience. Yet, this does not mean that attacks 
on military personnel and military targets cannot be evaluated as terrorist acts. 
Unless the attacked military personnel is an occupier in a foreign territory, the 
attacks on military personnel or military target can be regarded as acts of 
terrorism. Furthermore, attacks on the military targets indirectly terrorize 
civilians since military personnel and organs of states are supposed to protect 
its nationals. Terrorists attack on military personnel lead citizens to feel 
vulnerable against further threats. Therefore, such attacks increase the fear 
aimed by terrorists and reach a large audience.  
To sum up, in this chapter, we discussed different types of violence and 
stated the distinct characteristics of terrorism. We argued that terrorism should 
be defined by the nature of the act, not the identity of the perpetrators or the 
nature of the cause. We tried to figure out general characteristics of the act of 
terrorism considering the other definitions as well. As a result, we summarize 
that all terrorist acts entail violence or threat of violence, usually coupled with 
particular demands. The brutality is directed mainly against civilian targets, but  
occasionally against the military targets. The purposes are political. The actions 
are carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity. The perpetrators 
are usually members of an organized group and unlike other criminals, they 
often claim recognition for the act. And, finally the act is intended to produce 
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effects beyond the immediate physical damage.36 Besides highlighting the 
features of terrorism, as a distinct type of violence, we preferred a short 
definition including the features above. Terrorism is defined as ‘a premeditated 
use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political 
objective through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience’.37 
 In the following chapter, we will utilize this definition and multiply the 
definition of terrorism for its varieties according to the main characteristics of 
these varieties. It should be kept in mind that even though we produced a 
definition here, as the historical path of terrorism suggests, states’ position 
towards terrorist organizations have always been under the impact of states’ 
security concerns. States have avoided producing a common definition of 
terrorism not to restrict themselves on an issue that might help them to reduce 
others’ security in the system.  Therefore, the following chapter will also infer 
states exploiting some types of terrorism as a foreign policy tool and helping 
terrorist organizations to gain transnational characteristics. 
                                                 
36 Thackrah, 26. 
37 Enders and Sandler, Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era,146-147. 
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CHAPTER III 
TYPOLOGY OF TERRORISM & HISTORICAL EXAMPLES 
In the previous chapter, the term of terrorism defined as ‘the 
premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain 
a political objective-through intimidation or fear directed at a large audience.’ In 
the contemporary understanding of terrorism, the perpetrator of the act is 
generally a non-governmental organization. Yet, the history of terrorism 
illustrates the fact that perpetrators of terrorism also include states or 
governments as well. We stated that terrorism is an organizational act. As the 
states are the highest political organizations, we also included states among the 
perpetrators of terrorism as a typology.  
In this chapter, we will first divide terrorism into two basic categories: 
state and non-state terrorism. Later, we further classify state terrorism in 
domestic and international parts due to their targets. Second, non-state 
terrorism is separated according to referents of the terrorist act into two 
categories: domestic and transnational terrorism.  This chapter discusses the 
use of terror for political purposes in the light of historical examples and infers 
that terrorism has evolved throughout the centuries and become outward 
oriented rather than inward oriented in its scope and targets. Also, the historical 
examples will indicate terrorism gained a more complex composition, as the 
time gets closer. Therefore, the classification in this chapter works both 
vertically and horizontally in time, meaning that we argue that while some types 
of terrorist organizations remain limited in scope and category, some terrorist 
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organizations turn out to be a different terrorist organization in categorization in 
proceeding time as their capabilities have changed. 
 
3.1 State Terrorism  
3.1.1 Domestic State Terrorism  
Domestic state terrorism consists of acts conducted by a government 
against its own citizens and within its own borders.38 In this respect, the roots of 
state terrorism are based on the philosophical thoughts of Thomas Hobbes. In 
his famous book, the Leviathan (1651), Hobbes argues that the state was 
evolved by man to check his savageness. The Leviathan was granted rights of 
the man and became the sole authority that can use violence to provide social 
obedience and order.39 Given the right to use violence for these purposes were 
granted by the common will, the state use of violence became legitimate within 
its own territory. 
However, including state terrorism in the study of terrorism is a 
disputable issue. Many researchers40 accept the existence of state terrorism but 
some41 argue that state-perpetrated acts towards its own citizens should also 
be qualified as terrorism. According to their argument, the exclusion of state 
terrorism from the study of terrorism would make the study flawed and 
incomplete. They establish their arguments on the appearance of the term 
                                                 
38 Wayman C. Mullins, A Sourcebook on Domestic and International Terrorism: an Analysis of 
Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and Responses (Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1997), 37. 
39 Albert Parry, Terrorism: from Robespierre to Arafat (New York: Vanguard Press, 1976), 9.  
40 Paul Wilkinson, Martha Crenshaw, Walter Laqueur are among these academicians. 
41 R D Crelinsten, “Terrorism as a Political Communication: The Relationship Between the 
Controller and the Controlled  “ in Contemporary Research On Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson 
and A. M. Stewart (Aberdeen: The University Press Aberdeen, 1987), 4, Noam Choamsky 
“International Use of Terror for Political Aims: Terrorism Image and Reality,” in Western State 
Terrorism, ed. Alexander George (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), 12-38. 
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‘terrorism’ in the political history for the fist time with the French Revolution and 
claim that non-state terrorism should not be studied by looking at the results of 
terrorist acts. Non-state terrorism should be evaluated as a reaction to the 
domestic or international state terrorism. In another saying, the roots of non-
state terrorism should be searched in the acts of suppressor states’ violent 
policies towards their constituents. Hence, this approach claims that non-
governmental terror organizations born out of the necessity to oppose the 
strong even though it is not legal.42  
The word ‘terrorism’ was firstly used as a political concept during the 
French Revolution.43 During this period, the term was used with positive 
connotation as opposed to today’s usage. This was because of the fact that 
terror was the means helping the state to re-establish order during the transition 
period after the uprisings of 1789 and to consolidate the revolutionary 
government’s power by intimidating counter-revolutionaries, subversives and 
other dissidents who did not want the new regime.44 The period lasted from 
March 1793 to July 1794. The reign of terror was created by two mechanisms: 
the Committee of General Security and the Revolutionary Tribunal. Both 
institutions were accorded wide powers of arrest and judgment. By decisions of 
these mechanisms, people who were convicted of treason were put to death by 
guillotine. This act of the state aimed to carry a message to the French people 
                                                 
42 Temel Demirer, “Terörist mi Dediniz? Küreselleşme ve Terör,” in Küreselleşme ve Terör: 
Terör Kavramı ve Gerçeği, ed. Mehmet Ali Civelek (Ankara: Ütopya, 2001), 55. 
43 John Francis Murphy, State Support of International Terrorism: Legal, Political, and Economic 
Dimensions (London: Mansell Pub, 1989), 4. See also, Wayman C. Mullins, A Sourcebook on 
Domestic and International Terrorism: an Analysis of Issues, Organizations, Tactics, and 
Responses (Springfield, Ill.: C.C. Thomas, 1997), 46-49. 
44 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 15. 
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that anyone who might oppose the revolutionary regime would be brutally 
punished. The rule of 1793-1794 constituted the very basic example for the use 
of terror for political tool.  
It is most likely that this type of terrorism has become a controversial 
issue in the contemporary politics, as perceptions regarding a government’s 
duties have changed. There are many repressive governments in the world 
applying violence. This type of violence may be regarded as legitimate as the 
repressive governments were also entitled to rule their states with the 
recognized right of using violence. In some parts of the world, the use of 
‘legitimate violence’ on their own citizens through state mechanisms is criticized 
of violating human rights. And, there are lots of countries that are still being 
governed by dictators. However, our focus here is not to develop a normative 
approach to international relations, though as individuals we accept this kind of 
terrorism as a very cruel thing.  
We study international relations considering states as major actors 
without looking at their domestic composition. According to the assumptions of 
mainstream International Relations theories whether a state’s domestic 
composition is democratic or terrorist is not questioned.  States also in the real 
political world generally avoid from labeling other states as terrorists due to 
domestic oppression they assert for political and legal reasons.45 Therefore, 
states usually prefer not to be concerned about others’ internal affairs unless 
                                                 
45 All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations. Available on 
http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/index.html; Internet.  
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they become subject to the impacts of these actions.46 However, to make the 
same judgment with a retrospective perspective constitutes less risk of political 
conflict with the labeled state. Therefore, states prefer such an attitude usually. 
For instance, the rules of Maximillien Robespierre, Vladimir Lenin, Joseph 
Stalin, and Mao Tse Tung and their states were exemplified under the title of 
state terrorism.  
 
 3.1.2 International State Terrorism 
International state terrorism is a type of terrorism as it is very problematic 
to find a direct connection with states perpetrating terrorism for their political 
purposes. The difficulty in dealing with this type of terrorism also lies in the fact 
that academicians cover the issue either under state-sponsored terrorism47 or 
they use it interchangeably with transnational terrorism, another type of 
terrorism.  We argue that international state terrorism is perpetrated by 
organizations or individuals48 controlled by a sovereign state for its political 
                                                 
46 These impacts may be migration or domestic terrorist organizations’ activities transcending 
borders or repressive states using its mechanisms to suppress its citizens abroad. 
47 Enders and Sandler include this type of terrorism under transnational terrorism. Enders and 
Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era”, 145-67. Boaz has three categories 
of state sponsored terrorism. First, states supporting terrorism, consisting of states that support 
terrorist organizations, providing financial aid, ideological support, military or operational 
assistance. Second, states operating terrorism consisting of states that initiate direct and 
perform terrorist activities through groups outside their own institutions. Third, states 
perpetrating terrorism, includes states perpetrating terrorist acts abroad through their own 
official bodies–members of its security forces or its intelligence services, or their direct agents. 
In other words, states attacking intentionally civilians in other countries in order to achieve 
political aims without declaring war. As mentioned above, according to international 
conventions, intentional acts of aggression against civilians by official agencies of a state, either 
at times of war or in occupied territories, will be considered war crimes rather than terrorism. 
Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter, 
available on http://www.ict.org; Internet. Jenkins and Wilkinson use transnational terrorism same 
as international terrorism. 
48 In Chapter I, it is stated that terrorism is an act of organization; therefore, individual activities 
were excluded from the scope of terrorism. Yet, in international terrorism, it should be kept in 
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interests. Domestic and international state terrorism differ from each other as in 
the latter the target of the perpetrator state is the components of another state. 
The act of international terrorism is carried out in another territory by a foreign-
state agent. In this respect, international terrorism is perpetrated by the 
individuals or groups who have a direct relationship with a sovereign state.49 
The perpetrators of international terrorism might be either an agent of the 
security institution of a sovereign state or a state might have a secret security 
branch to conduct terrorist operations in foreign territories.50 
Despite the fact that there are some cases in which international 
terrorism was perpetrated, it is almost impossible to find and prove direct state 
connection with a terrorist act. One of the fundamental principles of terrorism is 
secrecy, which provides some advantages to the perpetrators. The covert 
nature of terrorism makes it attractive for the states that coexist in the anarchic 
structure of international relations. 
According to structural realism, the ordering principle of the international 
system is anarchy. Therefore, states have conflicting interests. Security is 
scarce for the states. States compete in order to ensure their security. However, 
one’s security means insecurity for the other. States do not want their 
opponents to become stronger. In order to prevent the other state from 
becoming stronger, a state might become involved in international terrorism. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
mind that individual activities are also connected with an organization, that is a foreign 
sovereign state. 
49 John Richard Thackrah, Encyclopedia of Terrorism and Political Violence (London: Routledge 
& Kegan Paul, 1987), 33. 
50 Boaz Ganor, Defining Terrorism: Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter, 
available on http://www.ict.org; Internet. 
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 Especially, a weak state without enough capabilities to oppose stronger 
states might well use international terrorism as a tool to compensate for its 
weakness. Or, on the contrary, a strong state might perpetrate terrorist acts 
against an ascending state. By causing a chaotic environment through terrorism 
the strong state can damage morale of the ascending states’ population and 
bring about new opportunities for the perpetrator. For instance, Mumcu and Öke 
claim in their books that the British secret service played an important role in the 
Şeyh Said insurrection in 1925 because the insurrection weakened the hands of 
the young Turkish Republic on bargaining over Mosul against the British 
government. 51 
International state terror is conducted very covertly in order to harm 
others’ well-being to increase one’s own. Yet, states’ involvement in terrorism 
takes different shapes as well. In the following part, we will elaborate on 
transnational terrorism under non-state terrorism, which states benefit this kind 
of organizations as a foreign policy tool by escaping the cost of war and 
retaliation.  The indirect role of states in the emergence and development of 
transnational terrorism will be discussed in detail.   
 
3.2 Non-State Terrorism  
The history of non-state terrorism goes back to ancient times. As it can 
be inferred from its title, non-state terrorism is ‘the premeditated use, or threat of 
use, of extra-normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through 
                                                 
51 Uğur Mumcu, Kürt-İslam Ayaklanması, 1919-1925 (İstanbul: Um:ag Vakfi, 1991). Mim Kemal 
Öke, Belgelerle Türk-İngiliz Ilişkilerinde Musul ve Kürdistan Sorunu: 1918-1926 (Ankara: Türk 
Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, 1992). 
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intimidation or fear directed at a large audience’52 by a non-state perpetrator. 
This category of terrorism can be further divide as domestic, and transnational 
terrorism. These categories can be increased using different criteria as 
nationalist, separatist, ideological or religious aims of terrorists. However, we 
will briefly mention domestic and transnational terrorism as general categories 
covering other sub-titles and for better illustration give some historical 
examples. 
 
3.2.1 DOMESTIC TERRORISM 
Domestic terrorism is ‘the premeditated use, or threat of use, of extra-
normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective through intimidation or 
fear such that it is directed at the citizens of one nation, which has the same 
nationality with the terrorist organization.’53 In this type of terrorism, terrorist 
organization attack on the citizen of its nationality. States also indirectly support 
such organizations; it does not have to be immune from the support of a state. 
If we exemplify domestic terrorism, we can predate it to ancient times. 
The earliest known examples of the domestic terrorist organizations in the 
contemporary sense are the Sicarii. The Sicarii were highly organized religious 
men of a lower class active in the Zealot struggle in Palestine (AD 66-73). 
Historians claim that the sources about the Sicarii are contradictory. Some 
historians believe that the Sicarii used their acts to raise social awareness 
                                                 
52 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era,” 146-
147. 
53Mullins,  35. 
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among the poor and cause social unrest against the rich.54 Some of their 
activities indeed give that impression. They have destroyed the house of 
Ananias, the high priest, as well as the palaces of Herodian dynasts; they have 
burned the public archives so as to intimidate the bonds of moneylenders and to 
prevent the recovery of the debts. They have also sabotaged Jerusalem’s’ 
water supplies. Another comment on Sicarii’s philosophy is that they had an 
elaborate doctrine that accepted God as the Lord and refuted to have any 
political allegiance to any earthly power. Sicarii were characterized as extremist, 
nationalist, and anti-Roman.55 As in those ages nationality bound was not the 
same of the contemporary understanding, we can argue same nationality for 
Sicarii under the Roman rule.  
A more clear-cut example of domestic terrorism is Narodnaya Volya (or 
People’s Will) in Russia. Narodnaya Volya appeared as the most significant 
terrorist movement in the nineteenth century. It undertook its action from 1878 
to 1881. The organization was founded by some Russian constitutionalists and 
aimed to challenge tsarist rule. The organization undertook its actions 
selectively. The targets were the individuals whom the group considered as 
symbols of the autocratic and oppressive state. Their victims, thus, were the 
tsars, leading members of the royal family and senior government officials such 
as the governor general of St. Petersburg and the Head of the Third Section 
(the tsarist political police), General Mezentsev.56 Yet, the most important action 
was the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. Ironically, the group’s most 
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successful action became its last action because after the death of the tsar, 
most of the plotters were arrested and hanged.57 The Narodnaya Volya aimed 
to realize the ideas of Carlo Pisacane, who was an Italian Republican extremist. 
Pisacane argued that violence was necessary not only to draw attention to a 
cause, or to generate publicity for the cause, but also to inform, educate, and 
rally the mass behind the revolution.58 The members of the Narodnaya Volya 
endeavor to attract the attention of the Russian people to their cause and the 
organization. The use of terrorism for political purposes on the selected target of 
one nation’s governing elite lead the Narodnaya Volya to be defined as a good 
example of domestic terrorism. 
Lastly, Irish terrorism59 exemplifies an enduring domestic terrorist 
organization. The organization can be also categorized as nationalist and 
separatist. The activities of the Irish terrorism started in 1791 by the United 
Irishmen. In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British rule increased 
its pressure on the Irish population. Due to this pressure, an uprising occurred 
in 1916 against British rule. As a result of the uprising, Prime Minister Lloyd 
George legislated two parliaments for two groups in Ireland in 1929. One of the 
parliaments was in Dublin for the Roman Catholic majority in the south and the 
other was in Belfast for the protestant minority in the north. The Anglo-Irish 
treaty promised an Irish Free State of 26 counties in 1921. Protestant counties 
accepted a Parliament in Belfast. By the time England and South Ireland singed 
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an agreement and established the Irish Free State. Acceptance of the Irish Free 
State caused a split within the IRA and a hard-line element in the IRA wanted to 
fight for a United Ireland. The activities of the hard liners were against Great 
Britain to divert it from Northern Ireland as well as against the Irish Free State in 
the Northern Ireland. Due to their violent activities, the IRA was banned by the 
Irish Free State. After the declaration of Ireland in 1949 the IRA focused on 
Northern Ireland.  During the 1950s and 1960s, the IRA maintained its activities 
at the Northern Ireland border and caused the deaths of many British and 
Northern Irish security forces.60 The activities of the IRA still persist against 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland. As the activities of the IRA are directed 
against the citizens of a particular nation and its activities do not target the 
citizens of the other nations, the IRA also can be classified as an example of 
domestic terrorism. 
 
 3.2.2 Transnational Terrorism  
Transnational terrorism is a significant type of non-governmental 
terrorism.61 States have a distinct role in the development of terrorist 
organizations with transnational character. States may give support to an 
already established terrorist organization or their supports may lead terrorist 
organizations become transnational. Supports to terrorist organizations may be 
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financial aid, ideological support, or military and operational assistance.62 
Having support of a state, transnational terrorist organizations enhance their 
capabilities and become able to undertake severe actions.  
The acts of transnational terrorist organizations have clear international 
consequences. For instance, incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike 
their targets, or in which terrorists select victims or targets because of their 
connections to a foreign state (diplomats, local executives, or officers of foreign 
corporations), or in which terrorists attack airlines in international flight, or in 
which force airlines to fly to another country are typical types of terrorist actions 
having transnational character.63 
According to this, transnational terrorism is ‘the premeditated use, or 
threat of use, of extra normal violence or brutality to obtain a political objective 
by a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established governmental 
authority. These actions intend to influence the attitudes and behavior of a 
target group wider than the immediate victims. Also, the ramifications of these 
actions transcend national boundaries through the nationality or foreign ties of 
its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its institutional or human victims, or 
the mechanics of its resolution.’64 Paul Wilkinson claims that historically it is 
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hard to find a pure case of internal terrorism because if a terrorist attack has 
transnational consequences or origins, it becomes transnational terrorism.65 
Transnational terrorism and state involvement is an interesting subject. 
Transnational terrorist organizations mostly have domestic political origins. Yet, 
these organizations need support from outside to be more effective.  Usually, 
despite the improbability of proving direct connection, a state and a terrorist 
organization may cooperate, as their mutual interests require. Both terrorist 
organizations and its supporter state desire to weaken the targeted state. As the 
targeted state primarily deals with the imminent threat of transnational terrorism 
the security of other states in the system tends to increase especially in the 
supporting state.66  
For states, to support terrorism is cheaper, easier, and much more 
advantageous than to be involved in a direct war or a similar organization 
against a state with their own capabilities.67 As it is hard to identify a direct 
relationship with terrorist organizations the supporting state does not face the 
possibility of retaliation. As one’s opponent state that is victimized by a 
transnational terrorist organization constitutes a lesser threat, the other one 
secures its own position.68 
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There are numerous examples of transnational terrorism in history. 
ASALA (the Secret Army of Liberation of Armenia), the PKK (Kurdish Workers 
Party) and Al Qaeda are three of them to be mentioned. 
The roots of Armenian terrorism against the Ottoman Empire rule began 
in the early 1880s. It lasted until the late twentieth century against the Turkish 
Republic.69 The Armenians had a very long tradition or concern of protecting 
their ethno-cultural identity. The Hunchak and Dashnak parties were founded to 
defend the Armenians and attack Ottoman officials, including Enver and Talat 
Pashas accusing them to be responsible of the deportation of Armenians in 
1915. The contemporary Armenian terrorist groups claimed to be the heirs of 
the Hunchak and Dashnak parties and they claimed that the Turks were 
responsible of a [so-called] genocide or massacre in 1915.70  
The Secret Army of the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) and the Justice 
Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, both founded in 1973, were the most 
known heirs of the Hunchak and Dashnak parties. Armenian terrorists killed 
Turkish diplomats, their relatives as well as other civilians.71 The Armenian 
terrorist organizations had linkages with other terrorist organizations in their 
formative periods. For instance, ASALA members received training in PLO 
camps in Lebanon until 1982. ASALA later moved its camp to Southern Cyprus 
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and Syria after the Israeli invasion of 1982.72 Along this, the organization has 
claimed that they had cadres in a number of countries, including Switzerland, 
France, West Germany, Italy, the United States, Southern Cyprus, Greece, 
Australia, Spain, Portugal, and Iran.73  The group also had contacts with another 
terrorist organization in Turkey, namely the Kurdish Workers party (PKK).74  
ASALA reached support from different states in different shapes. There 
are various reasons for the support ASALA received. Some states may have 
been sympathetic to the cause of ASALA or some states may have regarded 
the activities of ASALA as harmless for their own interests. Some states may 
not have wanted to be involved in counter-terrorism efforts towards ASALA as 
they were frightened to be subject to the same kind of attacks. Some states 
might also have supported ASALA for their national interest. Whatever the 
causes were, some states did not cooperate to end ASALA’s terrorist actions. 
Interestingly, unlike the low level of cooperation among the states, the example 
illustrates a significant cooperation among terrorist organizations. Here, we can 
argue that transnationalisation of ASALA was realized due to the lack effective 
cooperation among states.  
Another example of terrorist organizations with transnational 
characteristics is the PKK. The PKK aimed to create a separate Kurdish state in 
the Southeastern part of the Turkish Republic. The activities of the PKK 
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endured from the 1970s to November 12, 1998.75 Nearly three decades of 
activities of the PKK had close relations with different states with distinct 
motivations and forms. Interestingly, the emergence of the PKK came to 
coincide with the end of terrorist actions of ASALA in the 1970s. Naturally, the 
emergence of a terrorist organization cannot be bound only to foreign support 
but the foreign support must have helped the organization live longer. In the 
following part, the helps of states in transnationalisation of the PKK and 
increasing its effectiveness are going to be illustrated mentioning two states: 
Greece and Syria. 
 These states preferred to use of terrorism as a foreign policy tool in their 
conduct of relation with Turkey. They benefit from the PKK in order to weaken 
Turkey’s hand. To begin with Syria, it is a documented fact that Abdullah 
Öcalan (the leader of the PKK) and the members of the organization resided in 
Syria. The recruits of the terrorist organization used the facilities in the Bekaa 
Valley, Lebanese territory under Syrian control.76 They were trained in the 
territory under Syria and used the territory as a safe-haven after carrying out 
terrorist attacks in the Turkish territory.77 
Turkey and Syria had conflicts over territory, water, and terrorism. Syria 
used terrorism as a card against Turkey in their conflicts over the water issue.78 
Syria conditioned its counter-terrorist policies towards the PKK on the Turkish 
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concessions of water.79 Reaching a deal on the river Orontes would imply the 
recognition of Hatay as a part of Turkish territory; however, Syria did not 
officially recognize until today that Hatay is a part of Turkish territory.80 
Therefore, Syria used terrorism as a crucial tool against Turkey.81  
Secondly, Greece also preferred to use the card of PKK against Turkey. 
The attitude of Greece towards the PKK can be closely related to the maxim 
‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’. Greece has the famous Megali Idea, in order 
to reclaim the borders of ancient Hellenistic times.82 The use of the PKK for the 
purpose of weakening Turkey was stated by Undersecretary Kuluris of the 
Greek Ministry of the Interior, in the 1994 edition of the Agon newspaper. It is 
stated that ‘it will not be difficult to cope with a Turkey facing big troubles.’83 
There are also several photos that pictured Greek Generals and 
parliamentarians visiting the Bekaa valley under Syrian control and touring the 
PKK training camps.84 Some arrested Kurdish terrorists confessed that they 
were trained in places very close to Athens. And, the leader of the PKK was 
arrested in the Greek Embassy in Kenya. It is for certain that role of the external 
supports played a very crucial role in the PKK’s growth as a transnational 
terrorist organization.   
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Lastly, Al Qaeda is going to be discussed. The organization directed the 
attention of world public opinion towards transnational terrorism after its attack 
on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon. In fact, the birth of this transnational 
organization lays its roots during the conflict between two superpowers, over 
Afghanistan in the 1970s. During the Cold War, the US and the USSR sought to 
compete in indirect ways and with lower risks due to the presence of nuclear 
weapons. As the European theatre was too risky for conflict, the Soviet-
American rivalry went on to the Third World.85 In that period, due to the risk of 
direct confrontation, terrorism is used to promote the ideas and ideologies, 
especially in the Third World. Terrorism indeed became an instrument of the 
foreign policies.  
Superpowers had similar external behaviors due to the international 
system.86 The similarity in the superpower foreign policies took the form of 
support to terrorism directed against friends and allies of the rival super power 
or directly against the superpower. The support included providing funds, 
weapons, training, political endorsement or other logistical assistance (passport, 
intelligence, use of diplomatic facilities, etc). 
The US aid to Afghani Mujahedeen resisting to the Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan can be evaluated under this framework. According to an American 
diplomat of Afghanistan, Robert Neumann, policies of the US concerning this 
country aimed at protecting the borders of Afghanistan, to promote a stable 
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economic and political system, to prevent Soviet influence that could restrict 
freedom of maneuver of Afghanistan, and to promote good relations among 
Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan.87 However, the passive policies of the US led 
the Soviet Union to pursue active policies towards Afghanistan and the Soviet 
Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979.88  
The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan created a serious concern for the 
US.  As a result of the Soviet expansion, the Soviets became closer to the 
Indian Ocean, Basra Bay, and Middle Eastern oil resources.89 The regime 
change in Iran especially provided the USSR a comparative advantage over the 
US in the region. This general political environment disrupted the US and led it 
to plan more active policies towards Afghanistan. 
As a result of Soviet occupation, the scattered religious and ethnic 
groups came together against the USSR. The US granted aid to Afghani 
mujahedeen resisting the Soviet occupation. It is claimed that during this period, 
the US granted arms to the Afghani mujahedeen amounting to 600 million 
dollars in addition to cash 300 million dollars.90 
An interesting group, namely, Mekteb-el Hidamet, received some of 
these grants. Osama bin Laden was a member of the group and he undertook 
some voluntary actions in favor of the Afghans. He participated in several 
military confrontations against the USSR in 1989. After his experiences among 
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Afghani mujahedeen, he founded his own organization with his mujahedeen 
cohorts. The aim of the organization was to fight against the US and Israel. 
The Taliban regime did not cooperate with the US and the organization 
of Osama bin Laden preferred to reside in Afghanistan. It should not be 
forgotten that the Taliban constituted a fraction of the fighting for the total 
control over Afghanistan. They could less likely succeed without US support; 
ironically they later provided the safe-haven for Al Qaeda, the most wanted 
enemy of the US. 
To conclude in few words, as Wilkinson claims ‘terrorism has an inherent 
transnational character’,91 yet terrorist organizations did not appear with their 
transnational characteristics. They passed through different phases and some 
evolved as transnational terrorist organizations. As we discussed in these 
chapter, terrorist organizations proceeded different steps. Different terrorist 
organizations in different time periods asserted distinct characteristics. Even 
though terrorism existed in all time periods, we observe that as the time period 
gets closer, terrorist organizations’ compositions also come into view as more 
complex mechanisms. Therefore, in order to figure out this proposition better, 
we will question continuity in their logic and the change in the methods of 
terrorist organizations.  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONTINUITY IN THE LOGIC & CHANGE IN THE METHODS 
In the previous chapter, we stated that terrorism evolved throughout the 
centuries and it became a more complicated matter. States’ vital role in 
evolution of terrorism is briefly highlighted with specific examples. In this 
chapter, even though terrorist organizations’ evolutionary process cannot be 
evaluated without the roles of states under structural imperatives, here, we will 
cope with terrorist organizations, as independent actors possessing their own 
internal dynamics and making a path in the history.  In the end of the path, we 
will observe that terrorist organizations become more effective in scope of their 
actions geographically and emotionally by using their predecessors’ heritage. 
As it can be observed that terrorist organizations have learned much and 
adapted themselves to the conditions of the contemporary world. They became 
able to take advantage of technological opportunities. The claims on terrorists’ 
irrationality or insanity seem to have little credibility. Conversely, terrorists are 
highly organized and posses considerable capabilities to reach their goals. 
Their inclination to increase their capabilities also leads us to consider future 
terrorist threats. Considering some terrorist organizations’ desire for the 
weapons of mass destruction, we will speculate on the future terrorist threats 
that might be posed at the global level. Hence, we will try to analyze the 
continuity in the logic of terrorism, the change in its methods and the prospects 
of novel threats by means of modern science and technology. More importantly, 
we will imply the growth of transnational terrorism in the end of this historical 
 43 
 
path by using the experiences of its predecessors and using its internal 
balancing mechanisms.  Even though Waltz argues this proposition for states, 
we assert that like each unit in the system; terrorist organizations also have 
their own dynamics to become stronger. Therefore, focal point of this chapter is 
going to be terrorists’ logic and methods in making internal balancing. 
 
4.1 Continuity in the Logic 
4.1.1 Opposing the despot or unjust governance 
In the ancient period, terrorism was always justified as a means of 
resisting despotism92, which is the worst form of government according to 
Aristotle and Plato. In that period, the opposition to the ruler was not undertaken 
as a mass movement or in the sense we understand terrorism today.93 
Nevertheless, the logic of the Trannicides in ancient Greece has provided 
coverage to terrorism to justify assassinations. In ancient Greece, it was 
assumed that there existed a divine and natural law between the tyrant and the 
public.94 If tyranny violates natural law, the public has a right to resist its rule. 
According to the assumed contract, the ruler was entitled to maintain justice and 
order. If one fails to do so, one has no right to claim obedience. Therefore, 
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killing the tyrant was an honoured mission for any of the ruled. Terrorists have 
regarded themselves as opposing an unjust and corrupt government and 
claimed righteousness in utilizing political violence. 
Later on, terrorists recognized the fact that killing the tyrant made no 
difference in their situation. The dead tyrant was replaced by his successor and 
the system remained the same.  Recognizing the fact that the end of the 
dictator is not the end of tyranny but a just a new beginning with a new despot, 
terrorists decided on the necessity of attacking the system.95 The aim became 
to provide change in the system rather than just killing the oppressor. Terrorists 
assumed a role of doctors for themselves for the sick society and believed in 
the creative power of destruction.96 
According to many writers, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center on 
September 11, 2001 were an illustration of the system wide attack. After the 
collapse of the USSR, the liberal economic and political system remained 
uncontested. As the leader of the rival pole, the US was perceived by many as 
the hegemon in the international political system. Liberal values and principles 
that the US represents in the post-Cold War era were claimed as 
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Americanization of the world.97 Many problems related to the international 
economy were bound to American politics. The US was held responsible of the 
system wide economic and political problems. After the attacks of September 
11, some intellectuals posited that terrorists wanted to illustrate that they do not 
share the American dream and its liberal values in politics and economics.98 
The selection of the targets as the World Trade Center and Pentagon 
constituted meaningful and symbolic acts99 signaling that the attacks targeted 
mainly the system and its values.100 From the perspective of the perpetrators of 
the September 11 attacks their action targeted a corrupt system and its leader 
perceiving the US as the global tyrant. According to terrorists, their actions are 
legitimate given American policies in the Middle East and the other parts of the 
world.101 
Interestingly, the attacked and the attackers qualified 9/11 attacks as a 
system wide assault. Discussing the reasons for the attack, the US President 
George W. Bush concluded that the perpetrators hate freedoms that the US 
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promoted all over the world.102 Therefore, they do not want to end lives but to 
disrupt and end a way of life. He claims that terrorists stand against the US 
because the US stands against them.103 Terrorists’ challenge of a global power 
was realized with unconventional methods. A non-state actor challenged a 
global power with its unconventional methods, which contain no morality in its 
choices on target and tools. 
 
4.1.2 No Moral Consideration on targets and tools 
The lack of moral consideration provides additional continuity in the logic 
of terrorism. Terrorist groups remain very small and weak as compared to the 
well-equipped powerful majority. Therefore, they disregard any moral 
consideration in their choice of targets and tools. In order to compensate their 
weakness against states they disregard peaceful and conventional ways of 
dealing with conflicts. Terrorists claim that the ends justify the means.  
According to terrorists murder for political purposes cannot be regarded as a 
crime.104 A German radical Karl Heinzen (1809-1880), whom it was purported, 
created the doctrine of modern terrorism, stated that physical liquidation of 
hundreds or thousands of people could be justified, as it could still be the higher 
                                                 
102 National Security Strategy, available from: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html: Internet 
103 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, “A Parallel Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and 
Globalization,” Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association, 
Volume 37, No: 3 (2002): 338. 
104 Laqueur, Terrorism, 26. 
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interest of humanity.105 The mass killings were deemed as obligatory actions for 
political progress and physical necessity. 
 
4.1.3 Secrecy 
Terrorists’ logic states that killing is a physical necessity. Accomplishing 
the task of ending existence of the target is very closely related with secrecy of 
terrorist plots. Secrecy has provided the perpetrators advantages in strategies 
of attack and defense against governments. In order to keep these advantages 
over states or governments terrorist organizations avoid being open targets.  
The fundamental necessity of secrecy for terrorists was illustrated in the 
nineteenth century by a Russian philosopher named Nechaev.106 He stated that 
a terrorist should live under an assumed name or a number, break all ties with 
his or her friends, and forgo marriage. Terrorists should be cut off from his or 
her comrades and find his friends in the underworld. On the day of action, the 
terrorist should disfigure his or her face with chemicals to avoid being 
recognized. In his pocket the terrorist was to carry a manifesto explaining 
motives and if surviving after the attack he or she would poison himself. Another 
thinker, Bakunin, suggests that terrorists should live under an assumed name 
and infiltrate the normal social life in churches, the world of business, 
bureaucracy, army, even the secret police so as to be able to reach the targets 
easier.107 
                                                 
105 Everett L. Wheeler, “Terrorism and the Military Theory: A Historical Perspective,” in 
Terrorism Research and Public Policy, ed. Clark McCauley (Chippenham: Frank Cass, 1991), 
19. 
106 Laqueur, Terrorism, 31. 
107 Laqueur, Terrorism, 32. 
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4.1.3.i Secrecy and liberal societies 
Most of these tactics related to secrecy are still used by contemporary 
terrorists as well. Terrorist organizations pay a lot of attention to their secrecy. 
Many terrorists live in cities with assumed names and ordinary jobs and wait for 
the right time and place for their operations. The recent example of September 
11 illustrated how terrorists can infiltrate societies.108 
Terrorist organizations have gained more advantages in the liberal 
societies, most of whom recognize the right of free travel and provide political 
asylum. The issue of political asylum is a very value-loaded and ambiguous 
matter. However, it is a fact that some terrorists take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by liberal states. Due to the night-watch state ideal in the 
liberal societies, the control of the state over the daily lives of the citizens is 
desired to be minimized. Liberal states became places where terrorists easily 
flourish.109 In his study, ironically, Walter Laqueur argues that whenever the 
                                                 
108 It is claimed that the September 11 attack destroyed America’s sense of invulnerability 
because it showed that terrorists were capable of mounting major attacks on soil of the US 
without being detected. Brian Jenkins state that at least 20 operatives from a terrorist 
organization that was already being closely watched by American intelligence services could 
enter the US, remain in the country for months while training to carry out multiple terrorist 
attacks of unprecedented scale, receive instructions and hundreds of thousands of dollars from 
abroad, even travel out of the country and return, all without being detected by the authorities, 
raised questions about the adequacy of American intelligence that are still being debated.  Brian 
Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 6; available from 
http://www.rand.org. Beyond the failure of the intelligence services, all of these also illustrate the 
fact that terrorist organizations developed their capabilities in infiltrating in the societies.  
109 We can also argue that terrorism also flourish in the states that have problems with 
establishing governmental authority on their territory. As it is discussed in the National Security 
Strategy of the US, states incapable of providing control over their domestic jurisdiction harbor 
terrorism. These places become safe-havens for terrorists. Yet, in terms of technological 
infrastructure and publicity opportunities, liberal states are much attractive than states without 
control over their territories. See for a detailed argument for America’s perception of states 
harboring terrorism, National Security Strategy 2002, available from, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html: Internet 
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means of repression has been most complete and perfect, there has been no 
terrorism at all.110 Adding to the opportunities presented by modernity, without 
control of government, terrorist organizations gained advantages that they 
cannot have in autocratic regimes.111  The lesser the amount of control over the 
society, the easier it is for the terrorists to conduct their activities secretly in the 
liberal regimes. Ironically, this is the dilemma that liberal states face in the 
contemporary world. 
Liberal states have a response problem in the face of terrorism. As 
terrorists and their activities are secret, states need to take severe precautions 
that may also be inconsistent with the principles of liberal society. These 
precautions may violate privacy of its citizens and restrict their actions.112 In 
liberal societies, governments have to be legitimate and legal in their actions. 
Terrorists try to push governments knowing the limitations of liberal 
governments undertaking severe countermeasures. Terrorists use these kinds 
of actions to justify their action when governments give strong responses. If 
governments do not take countermeasures then governments might be 
criticized as (if) they cannot fulfill their duties of providing order and security.  
Terrorists understand quite well the limitations of governments that are 
responsible to their citizens. The thoughts of German radical Karl Heinzen on 
the weapons of mass destruction clearly illustrate the perception on the 
weakness of governments. According to him, terrorists should use weapons of 
                                                 
110 Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 142-173.  
111 Brian Jenkins, “International terrorism”, in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, eds.  Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 73-76. 
112 See Robert Jervis for his discussion on the domestic implications of the war on terrorism. 
Robert Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has 
Not?,” Political Science Quarterly, Volume 117, No: 1 (2002): 37-54. 
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mass destruction because states cannot make use of indiscriminate violence 
without considering morality and civilians. Terrorists’ secrecy basically provides 
terrorists an advantage over governments because governments are obliged to 
pursue moral and legal qualities in their actions. Probably for this reason, Paul 
Wilkinson claims that anyone who pronounces to have a total solution to 
terrorism is either a “fool or a knave” because the measures the liberal and 
open democracies would need to take in order to eradicate terrorism would 
mean the violation of basic freedoms.113  Being aware of the limitations of 
governments, terrorists develop strategies of making propaganda by action. 
 
4.1.4 Propaganda by deed 
Terrorist organizations hardly want the gains of conventional combat 
such as taking and holding ground or destroying the physical forces of its 
opponents. Terrorism is a means for their goal.  Terrorists aim to make their 
propaganda through their fearful actions. Terrorists historically believed that 
propaganda by deed is more influential than thousands of leaflets.114 Being 
aware of their weaknesses compared to states and governments, terrorists aim 
to reach a large audience through their violent action. They want to give 
messages to three groups of audience, namely: their supporters, their 
opponents, and neutrals. 
To begin with, terrorists aim to give their passive supporters two 
messages. First, terrorists always assume themselves responsible for suffering 
                                                 
113 Wilkinson, Terrorism: British perspectives, 12. 
114 Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 59. 
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people. They claim to defend the rights of their supporters in the face of the 
opposed state or government. They want to legitimize and strengthen their 
position in the eyes of their supporters. By strengthening their position, terrorists 
want to create consciousness and increase active participation too. Second, 
through their frightful actions, terrorists claim that they are strong enough to 
challenge governments or states. Perceiving the strength of terrorists, 
obedience and cohesion among active and passive supporters increase. 
Therefore, it would be appropriate to claim that violence is instrumental for 
terrorists. Terrorists perform their propaganda through their actions among their 
supporters, and aim to gather more active supporters, as well as to keep current 
recruits. 
Additionally, targeting their opponents, terrorists want to create the 
impression that they are strong enough to challenge their opponents. The 
opponents are aware of the fact that terrorism has no rule. Without any 
established rule it is very hard to make estimates on the day of attack, means, 
and targets. This uncertain situation creates insecurity among the citizens of 
governments. The feeling of insecurity aims to decrease the credibility of the 
opposed state or government. As the states are bound to the framework of 
some rules the governments’ counteractions may not be as sufficient as they 
should be. States or governments are presented as if they cannot fulfill their 
basic responsibilities. Second, terrorists aim to create upon their opponents’ 
audience ‘who or what is next?’ syndrome and ‘it could be me’ impression. The 
fearful actions of terrorists aim as a dictum simply says ‘kill one and frighten 
thousands.’ 
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Lastly, terrorists’ fearful actions endeavor to raise consciousness and 
sympathy among neutrals. Terrorists giving the impression that they are strong 
intend to increase more supporters out of the neutrals. Terrorists also want 
governments or states to produce a severe reaction so that terrorists become 
able to damage the credibility of the opposed party. By providing overreaction of 
the opposed, terrorists may really create a positive impact on the society and 
potential constituency who may give active support as well. Also, terrorists 
would like to gain more sympathy for their actions. They want to utilize their 
sympathizers to hinder governments. In democratic states, governments take 
into account public opinion. The actions of governments should be supported by 
public opinion otherwise governments’ actions may remain limited. Therefore, a 
neutral mass that put out of government action hardens counter-terrorist 
measures and provides terrorists a chance of maneuver.  
 
4.1.4.i Propaganda by deed and ‘self-imposed constraint’ 
It should not be forgotten that terrorists’ action might lead to a strong 
enmity among neutral parties. Terrorists aim to gain domestic and international 
recognition on the basis of an assumed legitimate cause. So as to be able to 
claim some degree of legitimacy and to present themselves as the 
representatives of the weak against the strong, terrorists apply self-imposed 
control over their actions.115 
                                                 
115 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, Volume 13, Issue 4 
(Jul., 1981): 387. 
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Self-imposed action strategy of terrorists is supported by two arguments. 
First, terrorists seem to avoid taking terribly damaging and terrifying measures, 
apart from the technical difficulties, such as poisoning a city’s water supply or 
spreading chemical or biological agents that could cause mass killings. Actually, 
there are several examples of the usage of such weapons, like the use of sarin 
nerve agent in the Tokyo Subway in March 1995 and letters with anthrax sent in 
the US in 2000.116 However, these few incidents do not constitute a trend in 
terrorists’ methods.117 Analyzing the recent events of September 11 in the US, it 
can be claimed that the methods used despite its destructiveness, are quite 
conservative in terms of terrorist strategy.118 
Second, terrorist organizations do not only want to be seen as selective 
in their methods. They also want to be seen as selective in their targets for the 
claim of legitimacy in the eyes of their audience. Selectivity helps terrorists to 
justify their actions. Terrorists argue that they punish the ones who cause the 
sufferings of terrorists and, therefore, deserved to be killed. They assassinate 
particular leaders or even sometimes warn their victims or potential victims 
publishing a death list. On this ground, terrorists may be characterized as 
selective in their targets. 
                                                 
116 ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’; available on:  
http://www.terrorismfiles.org/weapons/weapons_of_mass_destruction.html. Internet.  
117 It is, however, necessary to indicate that terrorist organizations show a little tendency to 
change their willingness to have weapons of mass destruction, even though it cannot be 
generalized as it is claimed commonly. Brian Jenkins claims that nuclear terrorism, defined as 
the use of credible threatened use of a nuclear explosive device, has not occurred suggests that 
nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined. Brian Jenkins, “Will 
Terrorists Go Nuclear: A Reprisal”, in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, 
ed.  Kushner, Harvey W. (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 248. 
118 The method used in the 9/11 events was a modified version of the Russian revolutionaries in 
1907 that paid 20.000 rubles to an inventor who was working on an aircraft in the futile hope of 
bombing the Russian imperial palaces from the air. Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 382. 
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However, some also argue that terrorists may be selective in choosing 
their physical targets.119 Terrorists indiscriminately chose individuals, buildings, 
ships, airplanes, trains, etc. that they consider purposeful for publicizing their 
cause. They may choose these physical targets as symbols to demonstrate 
their actual target. The genuine targets may be ideas and principles and 
terrorists, by attacking on the physical actors of these ideas and principles, may 
indicate that they want to destroy the system. This type of violence is called 
indiscriminate violence because of its human causalities. Terrorists do not value 
the human factor and attack places where individuals reside or directly on the 
individuals whom they know belonging to one nationality. In both cases, 
terrorists claim selectivity but attacking on just one nationality and not attacking 
on the others cannot be regarded as such. For instance, Armenian terrorists 
aimed at the Turkish diplomats since they regard the Ottomans and the Turkish 
Republic as responsible of the ‘so-called’ Armenian Genocide of 1915.120 By 
means of indiscriminate use of violence terrorists want to manipulate the 
opposed governments or states. Indiscriminate use of violence is a very 
consistent action with the principles of terrorists. They create fear among the 
audience and became able to promote their propaganda through their 
dangerous actions. 
 
 
 
                                                 
119 Brian Jenkins, “International terrorism”, 73-74. 
120  The word of ‘so-called’ added by the writer, for detailed information, See, Çitlioğlu, 9-122. 
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4.1.4.ii Propaganda by deed and Media 
Propaganda by deed is used to create more publicity. Even though 
terrorists have not used unconventional methods with higher indiscriminate 
targeting, their actions so far seem to create serious intimidation among the 
audience. According to propaganda by deed strategy, terrorists take the plunge 
to become publicly known and recognized. Media enables terrorists to reach a 
larger audience causing the ‘echo effect’.121 The repeated audio-visual 
performances about terrorists’ actions increase their publicity and fame. The 
more the terrorists’ actions become frightening and dreadful, the more it takes 
up room in the media. Therefore, the publicity of terrorist action becomes just as 
important as the magnitude of it. If enough attention is paid, it can be 
recognized that most of the terrorist actions occur when access to media is 
more available.122 
However, in long term, it is claimed that the echo effect creates 
acceptance and ignorance among the society as the public got used to terrorist 
actions. As the public gets used to terrorist actions, terrorists have a tendency 
to go to extreme lengths to shock the audience,123 which is larger and more 
                                                 
121 Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann agree on Laqueur’s thought that media is the best friend of 
terrorists. However, they distinguish between conventional media and new media technology, 
namely the Internet. The authors state that terrorists, interestingly, use the Internet in order to 
justify their cause and draw an impression of political movement. Terrorists do not use their web 
sites for publicity of their violent actions. Terrorist organizations aim to reach potential 
supporters, to their enemies, and to international public opinion. Terrorist organizations are 
capable of freely communicating with their audience that is not possible through conventional 
media due to journalistic standards. Yariv Tsfati and Gabriel Weimann, ‘www.terrorism.com: 
Terror on the Internet. Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 25, (2002): 317-32. 
122 Ross, “Structural Causes of Oppositional Political Terrorism: Towards a Causal Model,” 320. 
123 Bruce Hoffman states that at least some terrorists have come to believe that attention is no 
longer as readily obtained as it was. In their minds, both the public and media become 
increasingly inured or desensitized to the continuing spiral of terrorist violence. These terrorists 
feel pushed to undertake ever more dramatic or destructively lethal deeds in order to achieve 
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diverse due to the media. It is, therefore, argued that media in democratic 
countries contribute to the growth of terrorism. It is accused of magnifying the 
impact of terrorist actions.124 Interestingly, terrorists take actions to ensure a 
place in the media, as media creates acceptance among the audience, 
terrorists need to take more dreadful actions. Even though media can also be 
used as a counter-terrorism tool, the relationship between media and terrorism 
seems to be a vicious circle. 
Until now, we elaborated on the continuities in the history of terrorism. 
Terrorists still make use of these basic principles, while taking action. They 
undertake covertly dreadful actions in order to publicize their cause and select 
targets that would bring the most reaction. We asserted that terrorists limit their 
actions not to bring a severe backlash and disrupt their active or passive 
sympathizers. They also face a legitimacy concern towards their constituents. 
Therefore, they use conventional methods. Conventional means the methods 
employed by terrorists for a long time period and therefore can be estimated in 
kind, such as assassination, hijacking, bombing, and embassy takeover. The 
attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 illustrated how 
destructive terrorists can be even without using unconventional methods, 
namely weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In the following part of the 
chapter, we will try to converse the prospects terrorists have by comparing the 
conventional methods that are still in use.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
the same effect that a less bloody action may have had in the past. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism 
Trends and Prospects, 13; available on http://www.rand.org.  
124Elegab, International Law Documents Relating to Terrorism, iv. 
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4.2 Change in the Methods 
Terrorists have discovered the possible contributions of modern 
technology to terrorism. Terrorists recognized that technology could 
compensate terrorists’ weakness against states or governments. Technology 
provides an increase in the quality of terrorist attacks. The application of 
modern technology in terrorism provided perpetrators with cost effectiveness 
and higher destructiveness.125 Terrorists’ success in creating power out of 
impotence is very closely related with technological advances. Technological 
advances in weapons technology, explosives, transportation, communication 
and banking ease terrorist calculations as their effectiveness increases and the 
cost of their actions decreases.126 In a way, terrorists also adapted themselves 
into the global civil infrastructure to inflict considerable challenge. This 
adaptability provided terrorism an internal dynamic, and changed terrorist 
actions in quality. 
Developments in technology and communication have played a very 
crucial role in terrorists constituting a global challenge.127 Interestingly, in the 
International Anarchist Congress, in 1881, one of the delegates named Ganz 
                                                 
125 John Lewis Gaddis states that ‘[T]he attack’s cost-effectiveness was equally striking. No 
previous act of terrorism came to close to this one in lives lost and damaged inflicted.  The dead 
were almost twice the number killed in some three decades of violence in Northern Ireland. 
They are ten times the toll on the both sided in the most recent round of the Israeli-Palestinian 
intifada. They exceed, in the deaths suffered on a single day, the most violent battles of the 
American Civil War. The operation required the lives of nineteen terrorists and expenditures of 
about $ 500,000. The ‘payoff’, if we can use such a brutal transaction, was approximately 5,000 
dead and perhaps as much as $ 100 billion in recovery costs.  Ratios like these-some 263 
victims for every terrorist, and $2000 in damages for every dollar expended- cannot help but set 
a standard to which future terrorists will aspire.’ John Lewis Gaddis, “And Now This: Lessons 
From the Old Era For The New One,” in The Age of Terror, eds. Strobe Talbott and Nayan 
Chanda, (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 9. 
126Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” 380. 
127 Some argue that terrorism is the dark side of globalization. See Rasmussen,  “A Parallel 
Globalization of Terror: 9-11, Security and Globalization,” 323-49. 
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suggested that greater attention should be paid to the study of chemistry and 
technology in order to supply dreadful weapons for the struggle against the 
adversary. Upon his suggestion, Congress passed a resolution stating that 
affiliated individuals and organizations should devote themselves to the study of 
these sciences.128 The weapons of mass destruction were an ideal for the 
terrorists of the nineteenth century as they could cause mass killings and 
response problems for governments. The ideals and wishes of terrorists came 
true and the twentieth and twenty-first centuries were marked by the 
developments in the fields of technology and transportation. These 
developments served the welfare and comfort of the humanity, unfortunately, to 
the brutal aims of terrorists. Especially, in the contemporary times, terrorism has 
gained advantages over the states due to the abundance of technological 
developments and vulnerabilities of modern states due to their dependency on 
technology and their political systems.129 
 
4.2.1 The Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in the Cold War and post 
Cold War era 
The most fearful development in the field of technology is the weapons of 
mass destruction in the twenty-first century. The weapons that sustained peace 
through a balance of terror130 in the Cold War era have been declared as the 
                                                 
128 Laqueur, Terrorism, 51. 
129 The increased threat posed by terrorism is mentioned in the National Defense Strategy of the 
United States in 2002 as ‘Terrorists are organized to penetrate open societies and turn the 
power of modern technologies against us’. The National Security of the United States of 
America, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.  
130 Michael Stohl, Terrible beyond Endurance: the Foreign Policy of State Terrorism (New York: 
Greenwood Press, 1988), 22.  
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most important challenge to world peace in the post-Cold War era, especially 
after the events of September 11. 
It is argued that the difference between the Cold War and its aftermath 
stems from the risk of proliferation of the WMD. Before discussing the possibility 
and the risk of proliferation, we intend to describe the situation in the Cold War 
era with respect to the use of WMD. During this period, the weapons of mass 
destruction were in the hands of a few states. These few states, most of whom 
are the permanent members of the Security Council, had strict control over 
these capabilities to avoid proliferation. To assure that other states do not 
intend to have these capabilities, nuclear-power states promoted some 
international treaties.131 Most of the non-nuclear states became satisfied with 
the security umbrella provided by the superpowers since the acquisition of the 
weapons of mass destruction were quite expensive. Besides financial problems 
and control of the have-states, other states were relatively weak in technology 
and had limited personnel in the field.  
Compared to the Cold War era, however, it is claimed that in the post-
Cold War era the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has become a 
very problematic issue because of the fact that it became much easier for 
terrorist organizations to acquire those capabilities.132 It is argued that terrorists 
                                                 
131 There have been numerous nonproliferation agreements including, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) and Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR). Mike Shuster, “National Security, 
Nonproliferation, and The War Against Terrorism,” in After 9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction 
Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Monterey, ed. Michael Barletta (California: Institute of 
International Monterey, 2002), 1-5. 
132 Considering the relative ease in finding destructive weapons in the contemporary period 
Brian Jenkins claims that, terrorists still use the classical methods like bombing, hijacking, or 
assassination and that terrorists have self-imposed constraints.  According to the author, this is 
because of the fact that terrorists want lots of people watching not lots of people dead without 
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developed their capabilities to acquire weapons of mass destruction in legal 
ways as well as illegal ways. 
Terrorists are capable of acquiring weapons of mass destruction for 
various reasons. First, some nuclear states are willing to sell their nuclear 
capabilities. Russia is the most well known state supplying nuclear materials to 
other states or organizations.133 In the Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and 
Advanced Conventional Munitions,134 2001, Russia is mentioned as the supplier 
of a variety of know-how to countries such as Iran, India, China, and Libya. 
Academicians and researchers do not claim that the Russian government 
directly sold its nuclear capabilities, though in some cases it does.135 Corrupt 
officials and profit hungry firms are suppliers of non-conventional weapons.136 
These groups constitute a real security concern because they take advantage 
of the weaknesses of Russia by providing terrorists and other groups materials 
related to non-conventional weapons. Considering the Soviet legacy the 
concern about these organizations having and selling non-conventional 
weapons continues to increase. The exact quantity of nuclear materials 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
gathering a strong opposition from their own audience and the neutrals. Brian Jenkins, “Will 
Terrorists Go Nuclear? A Reappraisal” in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New 
Millennium, ed.  Harvey W. Kushner (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 225-250. 
133 Alex Schmid, “Terrorism is the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk,” 
in The Future of Terrorism, eds. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 116-
118. John B. Wolfsthal and Tom Z. Collina Wolfsthal, “Nuclear Terrorism and Warhead Control 
in Russia.” Survival, Volume 44, No: 2 (Summer 2002): 71-83. Robert J. Einhorn and Gary 
Samore,  “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,” Survival, Volume 44, No: 2 
(Summer 2002): 51-70. 
134 ‘Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of 
Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, 1 January to 30 June 2001,’ available 
on http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bian_jan_2002.htm#13. Internet.  
135 Robert J. Einhorn and Gary Samore,  “Ending Russian Assistance to Iran’s Nuclear Bomb,” 
Survival, Volume 44, No: 2 (Summer 2002): 61. 
136 Schmid, “Terrorism is the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk,” 116. 
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produced in the former USSR is unknown. The security at the facilities storing 
the nuclear materials and warheads are not satisfactory.137 Also, there are 
corruption and control problems in Russia, providing smugglers sufficient 
conditions to take these materials out of the country.138 
Besides the risk of terrorist groups acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction on their own, states might help terrorists having the capability 
directly or indirectly. State involvement increases the probability of terrorists 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction. They can get the weapons of mass 
destruction by using their own methods (legal or illegal) or sympathetic states 
may donate these weapons to the terrorist organizations.139 Considering the 
probability of terrorists having the weapons of mass destruction, some argue 
that terrorists can no longer be excluded from the calculations related to 
security. 
It is true that the likelihood of terrorists acquiring weapons of mass 
destruction really constitutes several problems. First, the possibility of terrorist 
organizations having the same destructive capabilities as states constitutes a 
strong security challenge for states. In the Cold War, a nuclear war was avoided 
by deterrence. Deterrence worked because the nuclear states had something to 
                                                 
137 For instance, from 1993 to 2000, the United Nations agency, which monitors the nuclear 
security, confirmed 153 cases of theft of nuclear materials, as well as 183 cases of thefts of 
other radioactive materials that could be converted into dirty bombs, that uses dynamite to 
disperse radioactive material in an urban setting. Unclassified Report to Congress on the 
Acquisition of technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional 
Munitions, 1 January to 30 June 2001,’ available on 
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/bian_jan_2002.htm#13. Internet.  
138 One special investigator remarked with some exaggeration that Potatoes are guarded better 
than radioactive materials. Schmid, ”Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: 
From Where to Risk,” 117. 
139 Thomas C. Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” International Security, Vol:6, No:4 
(Spring 1982): 61-77. 
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loose such as territory, population, and sovereignty. However, terrorist 
organizations have no defined borders, population, or reputation to lose.140 This 
increases the vulnerability of the states. Traditional methods such as retaliation 
after or deterrence141 before the attacks of the terrorist organizations became 
obsolete. Increasing the capabilities of intelligence remains the most applicable 
solution in this instance. However, developments in communication and 
traveling as well as technical weaknesses in detecting small and portable 
weapons decrease the probability of success against terrorists. 
It is also true that whether terrorist organizations have the weapons of 
mass destruction or not, the sole existence of these kinds of organizations 
discredit the traditional methods of opposition such as retaliation or deterrence. 
Terrorist organizations having the WMD do not gain a comparative advantage 
over the states in attack, as they are already capable of secretly acting against 
states. Yet, terrorist organizations with the capability of weapons of mass 
destruction have a chance to change their status from terrorist organization to 
something else. Shelling states that groups having weapons of mass 
destruction would have a radical change in their status and after having the 
                                                 
140 Mike Shuster, “National Security, Nonproliferation, and The War Against Terrorism,” in After 
9/11: Preventing Mass-Destruction Terrorism and Weapons Proliferation Monterey, ed. Michael 
Barletta (California: Institute of International Monterey, 2002), 1. 
141 Brian Jenkins claims that the very nature of the terrorist enterprise makes the traditional 
strategy of deterrence difficult to apply to terrorist groups. He claims that, in traditional 
deterrence, the adversaries do not exceed mutually understood limits and will not employ 
certain weapons, although their continued existence is accepted.  Deterrence worked in the 
Cold War because decision-makers of both sides were fully in control of their offices and were 
aware of the limits and consequences of their actions. Therefore, coexistence was acceptable. 
Deterrence regulated the conflict. However, this kind of usage for terrorism is not acceptable for 
terrorism. Deterring terrorism is a very different matter. Deterrent strategies may be appropriate 
for dealing with the terrorists’ support structures: economic supporters, supporting states, 
supporting communities etc... Brian Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, [book on-line] (Santa 
Monica: RAND, 2002), 25-26; available from http://www.rand.org.  
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same capabilities the actors can be claimed as ‘the equals’ strategically.142 The 
will of the terrorist organizations to be a ‘nuclear power’ and to have other 
chemical and biological weapons should be considered from this perspective. 
As it is mentioned before, terrorists have ‘the will’ to have the weapons of mass 
destruction. Yet, they have no sign of using these capabilities, except the Aum 
sect in Japan.143 Besides this case, terrorist organizations’ choices and acts 
indicate that terrorists still use conventional methods.  
                                                 
142Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,”  68. 
143 Leitenberg claims that the Aum sect totally failed to produce biological weapons despite its 
financial capabilities.  The author claims that the case was misinformed to the public in order to 
justify budgetary policy in the US. Milton Leitenberg, “Aum Shinrikyo’s Effort to Produce 
Biological Weapons:  A Case Study in The Serial Propagation of Misinformation,” in The Future 
of Terrorism, eds. Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 148-157.  
 64 
 
4.2.2 Conventional Methods of Terrorism  
Before discussing possible reasons of terrorists’ preference on 
conventional means, we shall analyze these conventional methods.144 In a long-
term analysis of the RAND Corporation, it has been observed that terrorists use 
methods like bombing, hijacking, assassination, embassy takeover and hostage 
taking.145 The RAND study on terrorists’ methods concluded that the frequency 
of terrorist attacks declined when the targets are hardened. However, the action 
undertaken by governments to increase difficulty of one kind of attack leads 
terrorists to fabricate other types of relatively cheaper and easier attacks. For 
instance, examining the embassy takeovers, it has been observed that these 
actions declined as the embassies became better protected; the governments 
became more resistant to terrorists’ demands, more skillful in negotiating with 
terrorists holding hostages, and more willing to use force when the negotiations 
failed.146 As the study indicates terrorist organizations undertake their actions 
when the counter terrorism measures are low and they increase their attacks 
when the governments relax their measures.147 Taking action, terrorists 
consider allocating their resources among various modes of operation, so as to 
                                                 
144 John Lewis Gaddis claims that ‘[w]hat was striking about September 11 was the success 
with which the terrorists transformed objects we had never before regarded as dangerous into 
weapons of lethal potency. There was nothing exotic here like bombs or even firearms. They 
used instead the objects of everyday life: pocket knives, twine, box-cutters, and of course, 
commercial aircraft. The terrorists also combined what may seem to us to be a primitive belief in 
the rewards of martyrdom with the most modern methods of planning, coordination, and 
execution. We confront, therefore, not only a new category of easily available weaponry, but a 
new combination of skill and will in using it.’  Gaddis, “And Now This: Lessons From the Old Era 
For The New One,” 9. 
145 Brian Jenkins, 30 Years and Counting [article on-line] available from http://www.rand.org. 
146 Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, “The Effectiveness of Anti-Terrorism Policies: Vector Auto 
Regression Intervention Analysis,” American Political Science Review, Volume 87, (1993): 831. 
Brian Jenkins, 30 Years and Counting [article on-line] available from http://www.rand.org. 
147 Enders and Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era,” 162. 
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equate the expected marginal gain per dollar spent on alternative operations.148 
Therefore, they learn from governmental countermeasures and their own 
failures and they adapt149 their methods in order to increase effectiveness of 
their operations. Considering the increasing effectiveness of terrorism, in the 
subsequent part, we will question terrorists’ tendency to shift unconventional 
methods by acquiring the weapon of mass destruction.  
 
4.2.3 Terrorism and ‘ the will to use’ and ‘the will to have’ WMD 
It is obvious that the use of weapons of mass destruction would provide 
more effectiveness than the use of conventional weapons. However, except one 
case, terrorist organizations show a little tendency to change their willingness to 
have weapons of mass destruction so far, even though this desire cannot be 
generalized for all terrorist organizations.150 Jenkins allege that nuclear 
terrorism has not occurred suggests that nuclear terrorism is neither attractive 
nor as easy as it is often imagined.151   
                                                 
148 Enders and Sandler, “Transnational Terrorism in the Post-Cold War Era,” 150-160. 
149 Bruce Hoffman states that every terrorist generation learns from its predecessors- becoming 
smarter, tougher, and more difficult to capture or eliminate. For instance, the members of Red 
Army Fiction after learning German police can find their fingerprints from the bottom of the toilet 
seats or inside of refrigerators, began to apply a special ointment to their fingers that after drying 
prevented fingerprints from being left. Thus, preventing its members’ identification or 
incrimination. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism Trends and Prospects [article on-line] 25; available 
from http://www.rand.org.  
150 Subsequent discoveries in Al Qaeda’s training camps showed that the use of chemical, 
biological, and nuclear weapons certainly was an aspiration, even if the organization lacked the 
actual capabilities. Brian Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 
2002), 7; available from http://www.rand.org. 
151 It is, however, necessary to indicate that terrorist organizations show a little tendency to 
change their willingness to have weapons of mass destruction, even though it cannot be 
generalized as it is claimed commonly.  Brian Jenkins claims that nuclear terrorism, defined as 
the use of credible threatened use of a nuclear explosive device, has not occurred suggests that 
nuclear terrorism is neither attractive nor as easy as it is often imagined. Brian Jenkins, “Will 
Terrorists Go Nuclear: A Reprisal”, in The Future of Terrorism: Violence in the New Millennium, 
ed.  Kushner, Harvey W. (California: Sage Publications, 1998), 248. 
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Unattractiveness of the use of weapons of mass destruction is related 
with several factors such as general reluctance to experiment with unfamiliar 
weapons; lack of familiar precedents; fear that weapons that would harm the 
producer or user; fear whether it would work at all or only too well; fear of 
alienating relevant constituencies and potential supporters on moral grounds; 
fear of unprecedented governmental crackdown and retaliation to them, their 
constituencies or sponsor states; lack of perceived need for indiscriminateness, 
high causality attacks for furthering goals of the group;  and lack of money to 
buy nuclear material on the black market152. 
Some of these factors are related to technical problems or financial 
limitations. These kinds of obstacles can be easily eliminated. Yet, we should 
keep on questioning the willingness of terrorist organizations to use weapons of 
mass destruction. The real factor that will hold terrorists back from using these 
capabilities originates from the uncertainty that they would encounter in the 
case of their usage of the WMD.  As it was discussed formerly, terrorists hope 
to reach a wide audience in order to publicize their cause and to gain sympathy 
for terrorist organizations. They do not want to alienate the audience. By means 
of terrorism, the perpetrators of the act claim to have power; power to have a 
political bargaining right over their cause. It should also be kept in mind that 
terrorism is not an end in itself but a means.153 Terrorists do not solely want to 
                                                 
152 Schmid,  “Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk,” 
120. 
153 Gaddis states, about September 11 attacks, that ‘ [t]he whole point of terrorism is leverage: 
to accomplish a lot with a little. This operation, in that sense succeeded brilliantly- even allowing 
for the fact that one of the four planes failed to reach its target, and that more planes may have 
been in danger of being hijacked. As a consequence, the images of terrified New Yorkers 
running through the streets of their city to escape great billowing clouds of ash, dust, and 
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kill people but to frighten them by killing some. Assuming these widely accepted 
prepositions on terrorism, we can conclude that terrorists get no benefit from 
killing vast numbers of people. The risk of losing their justification in the eyes of 
their constituents and the risk of losing support from other international actors 
are quite costly for terrorists. If terrorists lose their sympathy in the eyes of their 
supporters they would be strained to hide and conduct operations. Especially, 
sympathetic governments are the most likely to abolish their support. If these 
governments do not take their support from the terrorist organization they would 
both have a bad reputation and probably become subject to retaliation of a 
victimized state, unless the supporting state has nuclear power. Nevertheless, 
these assumptions do not challenge the will of the terrorist organizations to 
have that capability. 
Terrorist organizations especially some154 of them are willing to acquire 
the weapons of mass destruction. Considering the risk that they will encounter 
in case of using WMD, why should terrorist organizations strive for getting the 
capability? Shelling states that an organization that had the qualified, people, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
building fragments; or of the government in Washington forced to seek shelter; or of several 
days of skies devoid of the contrails we have come to aircraft to add to atmosphere over our 
heads- these memories will remain in our minds jus vividly as the images, from six decades 
earlier, of within an American naval base on American territory.’ John Lewis Gaddis, “And Now 
This: Lessons From the Old Era For The New One,” 10. 
154 Bruce Hoffman states that although the total volume of the terrorist incidents worldwide has 
declined in the 1990s, the percentage of terrorist incidents resulting in facilities has nonetheless 
grown. He states that the increase in the lethality of terrorism is closely related with religious 
terrorism, besides other reasons. To him, religion provides a mechanism for legitimization and 
justification, concepts of morality. For a religious terrorist, violence is a sacramental act or a 
divine duty, executed in direct response to some theological demand or imperative and justified 
by scripture. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism Trends and Prospects [article on-line] 7-21; available 
from http://www.rand.org. Yet, as it was discussed in the Chapter II, religious terrorism is not a 
new phenomenon. This type of terrorism existed in the ancient ages as well. Despite religion 
can be categorized, as a motivating factor lethality of terrorism should be considered in the 
framework of their increasing capabilities, weaknesses of the states, and the adaptability of 
terrorists.    
 68 
 
money, the teamwork, and discipline to bring off the successful construction of a 
nuclear bomb would have plenty of time and plenty of reasons to think carefully 
about how to use this potential.155 The usage of the nuclear weapons so far was 
to ‘deter’ the other party. Deterrence means the act of preventing or 
discouraging someone from acting by means of fear, doubt, or the like.’156 
Deterrence requires a capability whose existence would lead fear and inaction. 
In this sense, Shelling asserts that nuclear weapons are themselves terrorist; 
nuclear terror is not related with the identity of the user. Therefore, national 
governments and non-governmental entities cannot be differentiated from each 
other by the use of nuclear weapons.157 To him, if a government that exploited 
any real or pretended nuclear capability would appear to ‘descend’ to the level 
of terrorist organization while a terrorist organization that possess credibly to 
possess nuclear weapons might ‘ascend’ to the status of a government.158 
Terrorists come to the point that they can apply passive terror rather than active 
terror.159  
The shift from ‘to terrorize’ to ‘to deter’ would originate a considerable 
degree of change in the status of terrorist organizations. While terrorist 
organizations reach the capability to deter the states more than ever, states’ 
power positions remains the same. Terrorist organizations are secret and aim to 
cause uncertainty, fear, and insecurity. Terrorist organizations with nuclear 
capability or other types of the weapons of mass destruction would make them 
                                                 
155Schelling, “Who Will Have the Bomb?,” 86. 
156Schelling, “Who Will Have the Bomb?,” 86. 
157Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” 68. 
158Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” 66. 
159Schelling, “Thinking about Nuclear Terrorism,” 67. 
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more frightening. Due to the risk of terrorists’ using their capability, states might 
feel obligation to negotiate with terrorist organizations. Change in the 
distribution of capabilities among the non-state and state actors would bring 
recognition to terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations with the capability 
of the weapons of mass destruction might become international actors who 
should be taken into account by states in their calculations related to security 
especially. 
Terrorist actors’ role and position would also be different if they acquire 
the WMD. If a terrorist organization obtained the WMD power then it would be 
very hard for a state to retaliate, states that are suspected to provide safe 
haven, financial help, or political asylum. Terrorist organizations with the WMD 
power would come to the help of its supporters.  For instance, if Al Qaeda had 
had nuclear capabilities and it made the same conventional type attacks on the 
US; the response of the US would have been different. If we apply the state to 
state relations in the Cold War period to the relations between terrorist 
organizations and states, then it would be possible to claim that by means of 
WMD the terrorist organizations could have second strike capability over the 
states. As terrorists are secret and undertake their surprise attacks on a target, 
even if states have the capability to retaliate, due to the WMD capability of 
terrorist organizations, a state has to consider the next action of terrorists before 
terrorists get WMD. This situation definitely leaves states vulnerable against 
terrorist organizations. 
Yet, terrorist organizations not only become threats to states in the 
security realm but also in the public realm. A terrorist organization with the 
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WMD capabilities would, without a doubt, have an enormous amount of 
enemies. It; however, would also have strong friends and a supporting audience 
than without that capability. As we discussed before, terrorist organizations 
claim that they undertake terrorist actions for sacred causes.  They claim to be 
representatives of suffering people for some reason. If or when a terrorist 
organization has the WMD capability, its supporters would increase among the 
audience. The supporters would believe that they are represented by the 
terrorist organization in the way it should be. If we again consider the Al Qaeda 
case, Osama bin Laden has a great deal of support in the Arab world.  If the 
terrorist organization had acquired the WMD, before the US reaction after 
September 11, then it would be almost impossible to deter Osama bin Laden.160 
Therefore, it would not be wrong to conclude that the stronger terrorist 
organization, the more public support for its cause. Larger public support means 
that more possible recruits for terrorist organizations, therefore, an increase in 
the population of the terrorist organizations.161 
Also, it should be kept in mind that a terrorist organization with WMD 
capability would put a precedent for the other terrorist organization and increase 
cooperation among them. A terrorist organization with capabilities would help 
                                                 
160 Bruce Hoffman states that Al Qaeda could use WMD against the US but retaliation –certainly 
escalation – would be difficult because (1) the US will not use chemical, biological, or 
radiological weapons, (2) its nuclear weapons will seldom be suitable for use, and (3) there are 
no good targets. Bruce Hoffman, Terrorism Trends and Prospects [article on-line] 39; available 
from http://www.rand.org.  
161 Brian Jenkins claims that quantity of terrorist organization translates into its quality because 
quantity enables organizers of terrorist organizations to exploit and identify specialized talent 
that would be scarce or not available in a smaller enterprise. If we interpret the quantity and 
quality relation, then we can conclude that terrorist organizations with higher constituents gain 
an important component of power, which is population. Brian Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, 
[book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 4; available from http://www.rand.org. See also, 
Philip B. Heymann, “Dealing with Terrorism: An Overview,” International Security, Volume 26, 
No: 3 (Winter, 2001/02): 24-38. 
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other terrorist organizations to acquire similar capabilities or it would provide 
necessary conditions for that purpose such as proctoring and training. These 
activities would become easier for terrorists because retaliation, deterrence, or 
attempts of preventive strike would be harder for states. States would also 
suspect that terrorists have nuclear weapons more than they claim because 
states would assume that once terrorists make the bomb they could also make 
more of them.  Also, as the terrorist organization gets stronger, the group 
cohesion would increase; therefore, the success of intelligence would decrease 
for states. Under these conditions terrorist organizations would flourish easier 
and would constitute harder challenges for states. 
Considering these likely threats that terrorists with the WMD capabilities 
would pose to the states, we can claim that states would strive to prevent 
terrorist organizations from acquiring this capability. Assuming that states are 
like units and they function similarly in international relations, it can be inferred 
that states do not want any other organization’s power to exceed their own 
powers or they can less likely accept to be ‘equals’ with a non-state actor. 
Although some states might use terrorist organizations for their political 
purposes, it is less likely that they can allow them to grow up and challenge 
their power. Current political coalitions on terrorism illustrate states’ willingness 
to prevent terrorists having the capability.  Some states, especially nuclear 
states, are ready to challenge even other states that are suspected to be willing 
to provide the capability to terrorists. The control of nuclear weapons and 
proliferation remains to be one of the hottest issues among the US and Russia. 
The concern of the sole superpower and its allies for prevention of proliferation, 
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illustrate possible challenges that terrorists would encounter in acquiring the 
WMD. Considering the still known nuclear powers are states, it can be said that 
states pose a real obstacle in front of terrorists whatever their willingness is. 
To sum up, we discussed logical continuities of terrorism and desire for 
changes in its methods. As the logic of terrorism is analyzed, it can be observed 
that it is not a static phenomenon. It has some fundamental principles and 
constant and adaptable methods. Observing their methods, we can infer that 
terrorism is not bureaucratized. Terrorism has an internal dynamic that keeps it 
still a dangerous phenomenon. Terrorists adapt the conditions of modernity 
providing the same opportunities as it does to citizens of the world. Two of 
these opportunities are in science and communication. As terrorists cannot be 
identified, it cannot be estimated who will be a terrorist. A terrorist might get the 
same scientific education with others and use his or her organization. Or, he or 
she can follow the recent improvements in science from the internet or other 
means. Therefore, terrorists can acquire the WMD easier than before due to 
technical developments. 
Also, terrorist organizations might acquire the WMD thorough legal or 
illegal means. Theft, purchase, grants are some of the ways that terrorists can 
acquire the WMD. The recent research and the expressions of some terrorist 
organizations as well as the findings about them indicate that terrorist 
organizations have the will to acquire the WMD. 
However, we differentiate the will to use weapons of mass destruction 
and to possess them. The use of the WMD leads a great fluctuation in the logic 
of terrorism. As many experts accept, terrorists want to undertake terror that 
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would help their cause but not risk their existing position and legitimacy. On the 
other hand, having the capability would lead an enormous amount of prestige 
for terrorist organizations among its supporters and other terrorist organizations 
while the same situation causes a great degree of risk and uncertainty for the 
states. Having the capability of WMD, states and terrorist organizations become 
equitable actors. Terrorists leave to be the weaker side and they transfer their 
relations with state from ‘terror’ to ‘deterrence’. However, we also discussed that 
states constitute a considerable amount of challenge to terrorists in their ways 
to acquire the WMD. 
The most important conclusion that we can draw from this chapter is that 
terrorist organizations become more effective in their actions through internal 
balancing and they grow up as important transnational actors in the 
international system. This assumption refutes Waltzian assumption that states 
are the major actors in the international politics; therefore, taking account non-
state actors would leave one at the unit level analysis.  We will argue the 
opposite and claim that the gap between scholarly structural studies and the 
reality should be narrowed and transnational terrorist organizations should be 
taken into account at the system level.  In the following chapter, assuming that 
transnational terrorist organizations are also actors in the system, we will 
elaborate on the impacts of structure on terrorist organizations’ becoming 
transnational, the prospects of change in the international system according to 
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Waltzian principles162 and further implications of transnational terrorist 
organizations on states’ security.  
                                                 
162 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979), 89-101. 
  
CHAPTER V 
TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM UNDER STRUCTURAL REALISM 
The gap between the reality and the scholarly reconstruction should be 
narrow as much as possible; otherwise theoretical studies fall short of providing 
accurate picture of the reality. In the international politics, states are taken as 
the primary actors in the realm of security. Yet, some happenings imply that 
transnational terrorist organizations emerged as secondary actors that are able 
to constitute serious challenge to security of states. Unlike other transnational 
actors that are assumed to rival the role of states in economics, the 
development of transnational terrorist organizations is not subject to the control 
of states. These organizations do not exist to provide a better security for the 
states in which they undertake their actions. They are established to destroy or 
harm security of their target states. As terrorism constitutes a serious threat to 
the primary actor of the international politics, in the following part, we intend to 
analyze the relation between structure and transnational terrorism and the 
changes in the system due to the transnational terrorism, if there are any. 
 
5.1 Structure and Transnational Terrorism  
Waltz states that transnational movements are among the processes that 
go on within the system and states are main actors of international politics, 
whose importance can be denied only when a non-state actor develop to the 
point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor 
 76 
 
ones.163 Transnational terrorist organizations are also among the actors that 
survive in the international system. Yet, due to their ability in adaptation and 
learning, they become to the point of challenging states, even the super ones as 
the September 11 attacks indicated. Since transnational actors interact in the 
system as well, transnational terrorist organizations also have different types of 
interactions with the structure, states and other terrorist organizations. 
Structure produces a higher impact on the units than the units posed to 
structure in general. Structure imposes its impact on the units in two ways: 
through competition and socialization.164 Structure forces its units to act in the 
desired ways. It punishes and rewards the behaviors of the units. These 
impacts of the structure, in the end, cause the units to produce similar actions 
and avoid variance in the system. Due to the existence of a higher institution, 
meaning the structure, states’ relations with each other, states’ interactions with 
transnational terrorist organizations, and these organizations’ relations with 
each other assert similarities. 
 In fact, these interactions are overlapped. States play an important role 
in emergence of transnational terrorism as a secondary actor. States’ desire to 
ensure their security at the expense of the others lead them to support terrorist 
organizations by providing sanctuary, financial aid, training, technical and 
ideological support. This assistance enriches the capacity and capabilities of 
transnational terrorist organizations for certain. However, we cannot state that 
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164 Waltz, Theory of International Politics , 74. 
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the competition and socialization among states plays the primary factor for 
development of transnational terrorism.  
As Laqueur states that without their internal dynamics terrorist 
organizations would show a little or temporary existence even if there exists 
external support.165  Alexander and Myers also highlight that a small number of 
terrorist organizations have domestic character and are self-sufficient; also 
unless they do not have domestic roots it is very hard for them to develop 
without external support. The significance of external support stems from its 
efficiency increasing influence of the terrorist organizations.166 Therefore, 
transnational terrorist organizations will be considered as units having their own 
internal and external dynamics under the same structural impacts with states.  
 
5.1.1 Survival as an indicator of Socialization 
Similar to states, the primary structural motive for terrorist organizations 
is survival. Terrorist organizations assure their basic motivations by using their 
internal dynamics and features. Parallel to states, they try to increase their 
economic and military capabilities. They establish alliances among themselves 
and with states. Yet, above all, terrorist organizations guarantee their survival 
with their secrecy.  
Secrecy is the main principle ensuring terrorist organizations’ survival. 
Terrorist organizations are secret by definition.  Unlike states, they do not have 
defined territory, population, flag, or any insignia as indicator of their identity. 
                                                 
165 Laqueur, Terrorism, 137.  
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They inflict in societies, live under assumed names, work as ordinary workers, 
and participate in other social activities as they were one of us. As they cannot 
be detect in place and identity, taking counter measure against them become 
very problematic at national and international level. By means of secrecy, 
terrorist organizations sustain their existence.  
Sustaining their mere existence is not the primary goal of terrorist 
organizations. Terrorist organizations aim to terrorize.  In order to terrorize more 
they have to increase their capabilities. Terrorist organizations’ strive for more 
capabilities can be evaluated as their attempts for duplication of states. All 
states can be examples for terrorists, even the smallest states. What makes a 
state primary actor is the accumulation of its capabilities.167 States use their 
economic capabilities to increase their military and political powers and military 
and political means to enhance their economic positions.168 These are the 
components of the power of states and cannot be separated from each other. 
Terrorist organizations’ behaviors indicate that they also try to acquire all 
components of power, except a defined territory.  
 
5.1.2 Internal Balancing as an Indicator of Socialization  
Economic development plays a crucial role in terrorists’ attempts to 
enhance other components of their power. As Levitt articulates terrorist groups 
ability to act more efficiently and effectively is closely linked to financing.169 
Terrorist organizations try to increase their economic capabilities by exploiting 
                                                 
167 Waltz, Theory of International Politics , 94.  
168 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 94. 
169 Matthew A. Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” MERIA Journal, 
Volume 6, Issue 4 (Dec., 2002): 1. 
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the deficiencies in liberal economic and political systems. Al Qaeda constitutes 
a successful example indicating the case. As we all know, the terrorist 
organization developed enough capability to attack on the US.  Levitt states that 
according to the FBI, the attacks cost between $300.672 and $500.000.170 The 
finance of these attacks were acquired by using sympathizers who opened bank 
accounts in the Western banks, and who donated money to so-called charity 
organizations. As the case of Al Qaeda suggests terrorist organizations’ 
economic strengths are reflected into their military capabilities. Terrorists 
become able to undertake actions that increase their fame by means of turning 
cash to death. 
At this point, it is convenient to remember that terrorists make their 
propaganda by their actions. The more their capabilities, the more dreadful their 
actions become. As the more dreadful their actions are, the more terrorist 
organizations become able to terrorize and collect sympathizers and recruits. 
Therefore, terrorist organizations’ secret capabilities, in terms population, also 
tend to increase as their attacks kill more people. Cronin asserts that terrorist 
organizations cannot exist without the availability of broader sources of active or 
passive sympathy, resources and support.171 An increase in the numbers of 
recruits enables terrorist organization to select more talented recruits for the 
more destructive attacks. In Jenkins’ words, ‘quantity translates into quality’.172 
It is known that the impact of September 11 attacks on the some part of the 
                                                 
170 Levitt, “The Political Economy of Middle East Terrorism,” 3.  
171 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” International Security, Volume 27, No: 3 (Winter, 
2002/03): 54.  
172 Brian Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, [book on-line] (Santa Monica: RAND, 2002), 4; 
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Islamic world become positive. After the attacks, Osama bin Laden became a 
hero and sympathizers for the terrorist organization increased.173 In short, 
economic strength translated into military success also leads to an increase in 
the supporting populace, which in turn provides economic and military resource 
for terrorist organizations.   
 Terrorist organizations act in a justifying way this proposition and strive 
to increase their capabilities more by duplicating the most successful military 
actors in security realm. They try to acquire the weapons of mass destruction. In 
the previous section, we stated that terrorist organizations have the ‘will to have’ 
that capability even if they might not have the same ‘will to use’ it. Terrorist 
organization with the weapons of mass destruction will become differentiated 
among other terrorist organizations. As its supporters and solidity in-group 
would increase, terrorist organization’s ability to terrorize would reach its peak 
even if it does not use the capability. In Schelling’s saying, the terrorist 
organization would change its status from terrorizing to deterrence.174  
Researches and intelligence activities verify that some terrorist 
organizations have strong tendency to get those weapons.175 Al Qaeda is 
mentioned among the most suspected terrorist organizations that strive for 
acquiring the weapon of mass destruction. Jenkins states that subsequent 
discoveries in Al Qaeda’s training camps showed that the use of chemical, 
biological and nuclear weapons certainly was an inspiration even if it lacked the 
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real capability.176 In his testimony, one Al Qaeda member also stated that they 
made several attempts to acquire uranium to develop nuclear weapons.177 
Another example is the PKK. Schmid states that PKK shows an interest in 
acquiring Sarin, Potassium Cynide and Mustard Gas and to use these chemical 
weapons in order to blackmail against the Turkish government for release of 
Abdullah Öcalan.178The most concrete example indicating the tendencies of 
terrorist organizations is Japan Aum Shinrikyo. In 20 March 1995, this group 
launched an attack aimed at killing 40.000 personnel from government offices 
and National Police headquarters on their way to work on Tokyo subway 
system by using Sarin nerve gas.179 These terrorist organizations’ strive to 
become differentiated according to their ability to perform so-called tasks of 
terrorizing due to their resoluteness in acquiring the weapons of mass 
destruction.  
In this part, we discussed that terrorist organizations are subject to same 
structural imperatives and they try to create their power by taking advantage of 
their internal capabilities. Terrorist organizations rely on their internal means 
rather than external ones. Looking at the history of terrorism, we can clearly 
observe that terrorist organizations have smart mechanisms. They are not 
static. They learn and adapt to the conditions in which they live. As a result of 
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their historical developments and adaptation processes they began to assert 
threat to the existence of states. This fact verifies Waltz’s claim, that is internal 
balancing is more reliable and more precise than external balancing.180  
However, sometimes, mere internal means do not satisfy the necessities. 
Then, units tend to search for external balancers, especially when their 
capabilities fall short of as opposed to a third party. As terrorist organizations 
face the same structural forces, they also tend to find external balance 
mechanisms. As the researches indicate terrorist organizations with domestic 
roots and external support flourish better than the organizations without external 
aid.181 Therefore, in the following part, we intend to discuss terrorist 
organizations external balancing tendencies as an indicator of their socialization 
in the system.    
 
5.1.3 External balancing as an Indicator of Socialization 
External balancing means simply establishing alliances against a 
common threat. Similar to states, terrorist organizations establish alliances 
when they regard necessary. As historical data and observations indicate, 
terrorist organizations have two sources of external balancing: states and other 
terrorist organizations. States’ alliance making against a third party is named as 
‘balance of power’, in which states know the identity of their counterparts, can 
judge their strength and reliability. However, in this part, the alliance type that 
we will mention does not permit identification and calculation of power regarding 
                                                 
180 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 168. 
181 Arıboğan, Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna, 189. 
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the allied block where terrorists exist. Therefore, we will mention this alliance as 
‘unconventional alliance’. 
 
5.1.3.i Unconventional Alliance Among Terrorist Organizations182 
Transnational terrorist organizations form linkages in order to operate 
together and create an independent impact on states. Even though it is very 
hard to find proof relating to extent of the connection between them, there are 
historical evidences illustrating terrorist organizations’ cooperation. Terrorist 
organizations may cooperate for several reasons such as a shared ideology, a 
shared enemy, or shared logistic capabilities.183 Cooperative activities of 
terrorist organizations include making associated activities against a third party, 
exchanging funds and recruits, training one’s members, and providing 
intelligence one another.  
Normally, since terrorist organizations are secret their extent of alliance 
cannot be documented. However, Kishore states that representatives of Latin 
American terrorist organizations came together in order to coordinate their 
activities, in Colombia, in February 1970. 184 As a result, they decided to start 
                                                 
182 Theoretically, under the same structural imperatives we assume that terrorist organizations 
should have a competitive environment among themselves. As these organizations are secret 
we cannot find enough open data regarding to this assumption. However, there are two cases 
mentioned related to this case. First one is about the PKK and the other Kurdish terrorist 
organizations. Gürses, mentions a member of central committee of the PKK and his words 
saying that ‘we are like political viruses and we do not allow another Kurdish organization in our 
domain.’ Gürses, Ayrılıkçı Terörün Anotomisi / IRA-ETA- PKK, 166. Another example is the 
competition between the ASALA and the JCAG (Justice Commandoes for Armenian Genocide). 
Ercan Çitlioğlu claims that the ideological differences and the conflict over the leadership of their 
cause led these organizations to fight against each other.  Çitlioğlu, Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala, 
23-25. 
183  Louise Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” in The Future of Terrorism, eds. 
Max Taylor and John Horgan (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 216. 
184 Kishore, International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict, 40. 
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mutual exchange of funds and personnel among themselves, in 1973-1974. 
This is a very extra ordinary case as it is documented; however, it indicates the 
resoluteness of terrorist organizations in helping each other against a third 
party.  
There are also other examples in which terrorist organizations provide 
training, equipment, finance, and personnel to one another. For instance, some 
articulates that the PLO plays a crucial role in the internationalization of 
terrorism.185 Besides its own actions carrying transnational character, the 
organization provided necessary conditions for the development of other 
terrorist organizations such as ASALA and PKK.186 The PLO was able to help 
other terrorist organizations due to its abundant resources devoted by Arab 
countries against Israel.187  
Also, some terrorist organizations’ relation went beyond just providing 
assistance. There became instances in which terrorist organizations undertook 
joint operations. For instance, German Red Army Fraction (RAF) and the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) engaged in kidnapping of 
11 OPEC oil ministers in Vienna in 1975, in hijacking of an Air France airliner to 
Entebbe, Uganda in 1976 and hijacking of Lufthansa plane to Mogadishu in 
1977.188 Also, the PKK and ASALA had some joint operations.189 For example, 
                                                 
185 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 69-80. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The 
Present, The Prospects, 24-27. 
186  Hyland states that members of the ASALA leadership also admitted that the PLO and the 
ASALA had similarity in their tactics stemming from their trainings.  Also, the ASALA 
commandos who seized the Turkish Consulate in Paris in September 1981told the police they 
were trained in Palestinian camps. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The 
Prospects, 46-47. 
187Kishore, International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict, 38. 
188Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” 217. 
 85 
 
on 10 November 1980, an explosive device exploded at Turkish Consulate in 
Strasburg, France and the following day, in Rome, another device detonated at 
Turkish tourist office. 190 These were among the joint operations of both terrorist 
organizations. 
As a result of cooperation among the same kind, they became able to 
increase their capabilities. As the PLO provided training, finance and equipment 
to ASALA and PKK these terrorist organizations became able to commit deathly 
actions against Turkey. It should be kept in mind that the PLO was an 
organization having the support of the Arab countries among whom Syria191 and 
Iran existed. Besides, these terrorist organizations’ political affiliations, 
weakening Turkey and satisfying their supporters should have been important 
aims for all.192 In the case of the RAF and the PFLP, it was likely that both 
terrorist organizations without taking joint action might have not succeeded. 
Therefore, examples indicate that terrorist organizations increase their 
capabilities and become more efficient by binding their forces together.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
189 In its first public announcement of policy publicly available, ASALA declared that 
revolutionary movements fighting against Turkey and American imperialism are ASALA’s 
friends, the revolutionary parties of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples, both of them oppressed by 
the State, are only official allies of ASALA. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, 
The Prospects, 26-27.      
190 Hyland claims that underlying reasons of the cooperation among these terrorist organizations 
were the ASALA’s need for territorial base in Turkey and PKK’s need for training from the 
ASALA. Hyland, Armenian Terrorism: The Past, The Present, The Prospects, 48. 
191 Boaz concentrates on Syrian involvement in international terrorism in order to balance Israel 
and provides detailed information on the support for the PLO. He also mentions Hizballah’s 
relationship with Syria. He claims that in order to better coordinate and direct the activity of 
satellite terrorist organizations, Syria has established a multi-faceted military and intelligence 
apparatus responsible for terrorist activity. Hizballah maintains a good relationship with Syria, 
the latter controlling the deployment areas of the organization in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, 
Beirut and southern Lebanon. Hizballah must satisfy the Syrian regime both because the 
organization's bases, training camps and headquarters are located in areas controlled by Syria, 
and because Hizballah weapons and activists arriving from Iran must cross Syrian territory to 
get to the bases in Lebanon. Boaz Ganor, Syria and Terrorism [article on-line] (Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs); available on http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa26.htm. Internet. 
192 Çitlioğlu, Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala, 56-59. 
 86 
 
Terrorist organizations also take advantage of opportunities provided by states 
and they establish alliances with them. 
 
5.1.3.ii Unconventional Alliance Among States and Terrorist Organizations 
States take place among the external capabilities of terrorist 
organizations. Terrorist organizations are smart mechanisms that exploit the 
weakest points of states. States strive for relative gain and sustain their 
wellbeing at the expense of the other states in the system. Therefore, they 
cheat and provide support for terrorist organizations. Terrorist organizations 
become sub-contractor of states, carrying out one’s conflictive relations against 
another state.  Naturally, terrorist organizations do not undertake this contract 
for its own goodness. Contract is accepted as it works for the interests of parties 
involve. When the interests of two parties coincide, then an unconventional 
alliance comes to being. 
States tend to use terrorist organizations as sub-contractors because its 
costs and risks are low, and if successful the benefits are high.193 The use of 
terrorism is believed to be the weapon of the weak states. Yet, history shows 
that this assertion has a little credibility because even the superpowers used 
terrorism as a tool for their foreign policy conducts. There are cases when small 
powers use terrorism against very strong state or equal power states using the 
same tool. This fact indicates that there are structural factors that force each 
range of states acting in the similar way. Therefore, we can assert that every 
state in the system might use supporting terrorism as a foreign policy tool when 
                                                 
193  Richardson, “Terrorists as Transnational Actors,” 212. 
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it deems necessary. As discussed before, the relation among terrorist 
organization and its supporter based on mutual dependency.194 Regardless of 
degree of dependency between two parts of unconventional alliance, terrorist 
organization benefits out of the untraditional contract even its actions ends up 
with total failure. It emerges as an actor with increased capabilities and 
operation experience.195 
The use of terrorism is not directly connected with the power conditions 
of the supporter state. As behaviors of the USSR and the US indicated in the 
Cold War era, even the superpowers might take advantage of the opportunities 
provided by terrorism. In order to avoid a direct conflict that might escalate into 
a global holocaust, the US and the USSR carried out arms race and arms 
control talks, conducted clandestine activities and covert operations, and 
                                                 
194 Here, we assume that terrorist organizations as independent actors whose capabilities 
increased by states. The importance of support by terrorist organization depends on its internal 
capabilities. Also, importance of the actions undertaken by terrorist organization depends on the 
need of the supporting state and its own capabilities. Boaz distinguishes terrorist organizations 
under the influence of Syria into two types according to their dependency on this state. First, 
Palestinian terrorist organizations totally dependent upon Syria: These organizations receive 
heavy (and sometimes total) support from Syria and are incapable of acting independently. 
They depend on Syria in every way: economically, militarily and politically, and their operations 
are under constant Syrian scrutiny. Second, Palestinian and other terrorist organizations that 
benefit from Syrian aid: These organizations receive ad hoc military and financial assistance 
from Syria. Syria allows them to train in its territory and set up offices and bases in its towns. 
Such organizations, however, are not completely under Syrian control, and they may act 
independently. Boaz Ganor, Syria and Terrorism [article on-line] (Jerusalem Center for Public 
Affairs); available on http://www.jcpa.org/jl/saa26.htm: Internet. 
195 Brian Jenkins states that growing state sponsorship of terrorism has serious consequences. 
It puts more resources in the hands of terrorists; money, sophisticated munitions, intelligence, 
and technical expertise. It also reduces the constraints on terrorists, permitting them to 
contemplate large-scale operations without worrying about alienating perceived constituents or 
provoking public backlash, since they need not depend on the local population for support.  
Also, they need less bank robberies and ransom or kidnappings to acquire finance for their 
operations compared to organizations without state support. Jenkins “Defense Against 
Terrorism”, 778. 
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sponsored and engaged in terrorism to promote their ideas and political 
objectives.196  
In the most of the scholarly studies concerning terrorism, only the USSR 
is mentioned due to its support for terrorism.197 Yet, as Waltz argues 
superpowers tend to produce similar behaviors due to the systemic 
imperatives.198 It is true that the USSR supported terrorist organizations in 
accordance with its local, regional and global interests.199 For instance, the 
superpower provided training in the Patrice Lumumba People’s Friendship 
University, in Moscow, to terrorist organizations from different countries.200  
Nevertheless, the US did not act in a different way from its rival.  It granted 
training to the terrorists of various countries in the US.  Specifically, anti-Cuban 
exile groups such as Alpha 66 and Omega 7 were among those groups that 
received American support.201 
 However, the most illustrating example is the support of the US to 
Afghani mujahedeen resisting Soviet occupation and Soviet support for 
Palestinians resisting Israeli occupation. As discussed formerly, the US’ support 
                                                 
196 Schlagheck, “The Superpowers Foreign Policy and Terrorism,” 170-171. 
197 For example Claire Sterling’s book named Terror Network is the most referred book on the 
Soviet connection with terrorism. See, Wardlaw, “International Terrorism as an Instrument of 
Foreign Policy”, 239. 
198 Waltz, “Emerging Structure of International Politics,” 45-47. 
199  Golan claims that the Soviet Union provided arms, training to terrorist organizations such as 
the PLO, the PKK, and several groups in Iran, Pakistan, Africa, and Europe. Its training camps 
were in the Soviet Union and the Soviet Bloc countries, namely, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, 
and Cuba. Galia Golan, Gorbachev’s ‘New Thinking’ on Terrorism (Washington D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 19-32. 
200 Stephen Atkins, Terrorism: A Reference Handbook (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 1992), 8. 
201 Kishore, International Terrorism, a New Kind of Conflict, 40. Schlagheck, “The Superpowers 
Foreign Policy and Terrorism,” 170-171. For more information about discussion please see, 
Chomsky, Pirates &Emperors, 18-40. Schlagheck, “The Superpowers Foreign Policy and 
Terrorism,”, 170-171.  
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of mujahedeen played an important factor in emergence of Al Qaeda202 while 
the USSR support backed the PLO’s position203 that was already better off due 
to Arab countries supports. Out of this rivalry, these groups enhanced their 
powers and increased their support from their clients and became alternative 
challengers in the field of security.  
Superpowers cooperated or supported terrorist organization to escape a 
risk of more serious confrontation that might have required the use of nuclear 
weapons. Nevertheless, some states cooperate with terrorist organizations to 
balance a common enemy’s power. The relationship between the PLO and 
Arab countries is a typical example for this argument. Arab countries were 
defeated by Israel for several times and they become discouraged to wage war 
on it.204 Therefore, Arab countries supported PLO against Israel.205 Arab states 
expected to harass Israel, in a cheaper way and deported Palestinians got the 
support they needed for their cause. As a result, both parties profited out of this 
unconventional alliance.  
Another terrorist organization benefiting from the rivalry among the states 
is the PKK. Syria and Greece provided sanctuary, training, economic and 
military assistance to the PKK.206 Empowered with this assistance, the terrorist 
                                                 
202  Demirer, “Terörist mi Dediniz? Küreselleşme ve Terör,”,140-141. 
203 ‘The Six day War, Israel Defense Forces, IDF Spokeperson’s Unit,’ available on 
http://www.idf.il/english/history/sixday.stm. Schlagheck, “The Superpowers Foreign Policy and 
Terrorism,” 170-171.  
204 In 1967, Six Day War resulted with a very disappointing conclusion for the Arab countries 
and Israel got strong out of this war.  After this war, the Arab States escaped facing Israel in a 
direct war and supported the PLO instead. 
205 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 70. 
206 Crelinsten, “Terrorism and Counter Terrorism in a Multi-Centric World: Challenges and 
Opportunities,” 171-173. 
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organization became able to constitute a serious threat to Turkey’s security.207 
These states used the organization as sub-contractor to gain comparative 
advantage over different issues without facing the cost of war and the PKK 
found available conditions to flourish in the region. 208 
There are also cases in which the unconventional alliance is established 
against a rival, who cannot be deterred with traditional ways. In those cases, 
there exist a huge gap between the capabilities of the target and alliance 
makers. Utilization of terrorism, provide the parties of unconventional alliance a 
chance to escape the risk of retaliation. The September 11 attacks on the US 
can be evaluated under this framework.  
With the demise of the Soviet Union, the US remained as the sole 
superpower that ‘enjoys a position of unparalleled military strength and great 
economic and political influence’.209 Some academicians name this structural 
situation as ‘unipolarity’,210 which tends to be balanced. Layne states that 
preponderance policy of the US gives the message that the world is governed 
by it.211 To him, as new world order is an assertive projection of America’s 
democratic and human right values, which reflect to its desire to press its 
                                                 
207  Turkey spent more than 10 years in dealing with the terrorist organizations. Thousand of 
people died during this process and Turkey’s military spending increased and its economic 
situation was badly affected out of this experience. Gürses, Ayrılıkçı Terörün Anotomisi / IRA-
ETA- PKK, 104-105. Also see,  Çitlioğlu, Yedekteki Taşeron: Asala, 83-86. 
208 For a detailed information see, Hasan Yılmaz, “Türkiye-Suriye İlişkileri,” (Unpublished M.A. 
Thesis, Marmara University, 2001) 
209 National Security Strategy of 2002, ix, available on http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf. 
Internet. 
210 For further discussion on unipolarity see, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” 
International Security, Volume 17, No: 4 (Spring, 1993): 5-51. William C. Wohlforth, “The 
Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Volume 24, No: 1 (Summer, 1999): 5-41. 
Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment,” International Security, Volume 21, No: 
4 (Spring, 1997): 49-88. 
211 Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” 33. 
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preferred policies on others, therefore, its policies tend to be misperceived as if 
it compels others to act as it wish.212 Some structural theorists argue there is no 
benign power in the international relations since states face uncertainty problem 
regarding the future intentions of the powerful in the absence of a higher 
authority and they tend to produce balance against it. 
Nevertheless, current picture of the US indicates that it cannot be 
balanced by the capabilities of traditional powers. The military capability of the 
US exceeds the all other combined great powers’ capabilities.213 As Wohlforth 
states, since the US power is unchangeable, the great powers know the fact 
that counterbalancing is a doomed idea.214 The observations up until the 
September 11 indicated that these words have validity in terms of the title of the 
challenger. The US was not challenged by any great powers but a terrorist 
organization. 
As Waltz states unbalanced power tends to be balanced by the other 
actors in the system.215 Waltz meant great powers as candidates to provide 
balance against the US supremacy. Yet, the challenge came from a terrorist 
organization. No state in the history dared to attack the US militarily on its soil, 
as Al Qaeda did on September 11, 2001. Researches on terrorism indicate that 
most of the terrorist attacks involving US targets are uprising.216 Cronin states 
                                                 
212 Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion,” 34-35.  
213 Waltz, ”Globalization and Governance,”4. 
214 Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,”  37-39. 
215 Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,”  915. 
216 U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, available on 
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that the terrorist attacks against the US increased217 in the 1990s, coinciding the 
end of the Cold War.218 To him, terrorism is a by-product of the shifts in the 
international distribution of power in political, economic, military, ideological and 
cultural forms.219 Since to assert a military challenge to the global power in 
conventional ways is too risky, some states, including Libya, Iran, Iraq, Syria, 
and Saudi Arabia220 use transnational terrorist organizations as sub-contractors 
against the US due its policies in the Middle East.221  
The US is the state according to which the polarity of the system is 
defined. The terrorist attacks on it indicate that terrorist organizations appear as 
the secondary actors in the system.222 The use of terrorism as a foreign policy 
tool may become the only option when there is a huge imbalance of power 
among the rivals.  In such situations terrorism becomes the weapon of the weak 
against the strong. Terrorist perception of the strong is very similar with the 
perceptions of the weaker states regarding the unbalanced power. In order to 
                                                 
217 Brian Jenkins states that Americans are the number one targets of the international 
terrorism. Terrorists focus much on the US for several reasons. Anti-American terrorism is the 
price paid for influence and presence. The US is the principle capitalist nation in the world. 
Radical Moslem groups in the Middle East may view the US as the principle source of wicked 
western secular influence. The US is involved in contentious issues around the world, Central 
America, the Middle East, and Western Europe. Local terrorist groups may exaggerate the 
degree f influence exercised by the US government thinking that attacking the American targets 
or seizing American hostages they will indirectly wield leverage over the governments they want 
to influence. And, American diplomats or businessmen, tourists reside everywhere, so they are 
also easy targets. When Brian Jenkins wrote this article the year was 1986, yet since then a 
little seems to change. Jenkins “Defense Against Terrorism,” 779. 
218 Cronin, “Behind the Curve,”: 43. 
219 Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” 53. 
220 U.S. Department of State, “Patterns of Global Terrorism”, available on 
http://164.109.48.86/topical/pol/terror/2002patterns.htm. Internet.  
221 Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has Not?,” 
42-44. 
222 Currently, terrorist organizations are secondary actors important actors in the system in the 
security field. Even though they have some advantages over states, they are not fully 
independent from the opportunities that states provide. However, as we discussed formerly, if 
these organizations acquire the weapons of mass destruction then they would become 
uncontrollable. 
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stop unbalanced power’s undesired action both collaborate. This collaboration 
descends states to the level of terrorist organizations but provides them a 
chance to escape detection and retaliation.  In the following part, we will discuss 
the victimized states’ prospects of response in the face of unconventional 
alliance among states and terrorist organizations. 
 
5.2 Identification and Response Problem 
Terrorist organizations’ most valuable advantages over the states are 
their secrecy. Terrorist organizations’ capabilities are very weak compared to 
states’. Benefiting from their secrecy, terrorist organizations escape retaliation 
of states. In the unconventional alliance between states and terrorist 
organizations, supporting states exploit the principle of secrecy and strive not to 
be retaliated. As the unconventional alliance not declared as opposed to 
traditional ones, victimized state encounter a serious problem in producing a 
strategy of response. To be able to produce strategy on how to respond, a state 
first should be aware of the identity, location and capabilities of its counterparts. 
In the face of unconventional alliance, victimized states’ ability to identify its 
counterpart depends on its capabilities. States with distinguished capabilities 
may get rid of problem of identification; however, this might not allow them to 
produce an efficient counteraction. In this part, we aim to discuss the options of 
victimized states and elaborate on the effectiveness of classical methods such 
as war and deterrence. 
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According to Waltz, states are differentiated according to their 
capabilities in functioning similar tasks.223 States use their internal dynamics to 
assure their security and develop capabilities to get rid of the threats coming 
from the outside..224 Therefore, there may be states able to solve the problem of 
identification. Victimized state may detect the parties of unconventional alliance, 
but still, it may not produce solution for several reasons. First, it may be a 
consciously made choice to avoid a greater risk such as a nuclear war. Second, 
supporter state may be such strong that victimized state may not produce 
response. Third, degree of dependency among the supporter and terrorist 
organization may prevent the desired solution. Last, even the victimized state 
have the necessary means available, it face problem of location. 
To begin with, states may prefer tolerating the use and development of 
terrorism consciously. For instance, during the Cold War both superpowers 
were aware of the fact that each of them utilized terrorism as a means to 
conduct their relationship, especially in their spheres of influence. Yet, this 
acknowledgement did not bring the superpowers to the edge of a nuclear war or 
a conventional war. In fact, both preferred this unconventional method in 
conducting their conflictive relationships. While they were preceding their 
conflictive relations by means of their subcontractors, they became able to 
conduct their cold peace relations and escaped a nuclear war risk, at the same 
time. In this case, identification was not the problem. However, to respond back 
                                                 
223 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 96. 
224 Military intelligence plays a crucial role in solving the identification problem . Some states like 
the US have effective intelligence agencies. Even though, the effectiveness of these agencies 
was questioned after September 11, the US is among the most capable states in dealing with 
terrorism. Jervis, “An Interim Assessment of September 11: What Has Changed and What Has 
Not?,” 47. 
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was a really huge problematic issue due to prospect of a nuclear war. 
Therefore, under the same structural imperatives, superpowers preferred to 
support terrorist organizations against one another and their solutions against 
terrorist organizations remained limited. 
Second, terrorist organization may be supported by a super-state and 
producing response may exceed the capabilities of victimized states with the 
conventional methods. Even though identification of the perpetrators is solved, 
the problem of response is remains. If the state party of an unconventional 
alliance is stronger from the victimized state, then victimized state may not be 
able to respond the identifiable pat of the unconventional alliance. For instance, 
superpowers supported terrorist organizations in the third states. These states’ 
response options were limited domestic countermeasures against terrorists. 
They could not attack on the super powers as they supported terrorism. Turkey 
can be a specific example for this situation. During the 1970s and 1980s there 
were severe terrorist incidents in Turkey. It is known that some of the left-wing 
terrorist organizations were supported by the Soviets, even the PKK.225  Yet, 
Turkey could not respond directly to the USSR due to its support for terrorism.  
Possible repercussions of such a respond could spread and there could be 
another world war between the two blocks.  
Third, if there are not such higher structural constraints, and the 
victimized state succeeds to solve the identification problem, the success of the 
                                                 
225 There may be middle power states supporting terrorism. In this case, if these states are 
belong to different power blocks then a war among them would be less likely due to the 
possibility of involvement by the block leaders. Again, Syria supported the PKK against Turkey, 
if Turkey had waged war on Syria, the USSR and the US would need to interfere in this war due 
to their interests in the region.    
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victimized state impeding terrorism depends on the relation between the parties 
of the unconventional alliance. If terrorist organization is highly dependent on its 
state partner, then deterring the state party or waging war on it can bring the 
desired solution. However, if terrorist organization succeeds to develop 
independent capabilities from the capabilities of state partner, then victimized 
states countermeasures targeting the supporter state would not give desired 
conclusion.226  
This highlights the most important problem in fighting against terrorism 
that is the undefined locations of terrorists or simply their secrecy. Transnational 
terrorist organizations mostly have independent capabilities. These 
organizations may conduct independent operations than their supporters. 
Therefore, deterring their supporter state would not help solving the problem 
regarding transnational terrorism, even though deterrence may harm terrorist 
organization’s capabilities. Since terrorists inflict in societies, and do not carry 
any insignia identifying themselves they cannot be fought against or deterred. 
Therefore, a state with a great capability may solve the problem of identification 
regarding transnational terrorist organization but it may not be able to respond 
due to the problem of location.  More specifically, the US identified that Al 
Qaeda is its principle non-state enemy. Without a doubt, the capabilities of the 
US exceed the capabilities of the terrorist organization. However, secrecy of the 
terrorists turned against the US as a great handicap. Problem identification is 
intensified by the problem of location.   
                                                 
226 Having identified the supporter, producing response to state part of unconventional alliance 
is easier for victimized states. Initially, states try to deter supporting states and if deterrence fails 
they attack on them. The US’ attack on Afghanistan can be evaluated under this framework.  
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Since the location of terrorist organizations as well as their approximate 
capabilities cannot be known certainly, traditional methods in security realm 
almost fail to defeat terrorism.227  By definition, states and terrorist organizations 
cannot make war.  War is fought between the armies of states. Armies do not 
fight covertly. Their locations are known and approximate powers can be 
estimated. Therefore, if deterrence fails, then war can be fought. Deterrence 
works because both of the parties involved have things to loose, such as 
territory, population, economic and military resources. These capabilities also 
have permanent locations. They do not move as terrorists do. Yet, terrorist 
organizations do not have permanent locations. Even, in order to weaken the 
hands of their target states, terrorists inflict in even societies that they will 
attack. Due to these, states cannot make use of traditional methods against 
directly terrorists.  
Tendencies of terrorist organizations in acquiring the weapons of mass 
destruction imply that states will face severe problems in dealing with terrorism. 
Researches and findings indicate that terrorists desire to acquire the capability 
of weapons of mass destruction. And, no one can be certain about the 
                                                 
227 Brian Jenkins states that deterrence may work in deterring the state or individual supporters 
of terrorists. Economic sanctions against the state supporters may have some effect as well as 
the fate of Taliban constitute an example for the states supporting terrorism. Also, financial 
contributors to terrorist fronts may be also deterred by threats of negative publicity, blocked 
investments, assets seizures, and exposure to lawsuits, or merely increased scrutiny of their 
financial activities. Institutions assisting or tolerating terrorist recruits may be deterred by the 
prospects of all members close surveillance. Communities supporting terrorism might be 
deterred by the threat of expulsion, deportation, selective suspension of immigration, and visa 
applications, or increased remittances. Jenkins, Countering Al Qaeda, 25-26; available from 
http://www.rand.org. Yet, deterring the individual supporters may justify the causes of terrorist 
organization and may backlash. Terrorists might get more supporters out of such applications. 
The basic principle of law is that no one can be punished due to another’s guilt. If states punish 
the nationals of terrorists’ just because of this reason, then states’ fall into trap of terrorists and 
make self-justification of their being unjust. Therefore, repercussions of such policies should be 
considered very detailed before they are applied. 
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intentions of terrorist organizations. Hence, there is a consensus on the idea 
that terrorists should not be allowed to develop this capability, whether they use 
it or not.  Schmid states that ‘in desperate situations desperate people can do 
terrible things’.228 If proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction is not 
prevented then states became extremely vulnerable against the weapons of 
mass destruction. Terrorist organizations’ advantage over states doubled by 
means their ‘secret’ weapons of mass destruction.  
The level of terror imposed by terrorist organizations would certainly 
increase. States would need to be responsive to the demands of terrorists. If 
they not, they would dare to face unpredictable results. States are already in 
trouble with calculating the capabilities and estimating the intentions of terrorist 
organizations. If terrorists posses the capability of the weapons of mass 
destruction, then states would be helpless. Terrorist organizations with the 
weapons of mass destruction would lead a radical change in the distribution of 
capabilities across the units in the system. Under these circumstances, even 
great capabilities of the states would be insufficient in dealing with the ‘global’229 
terrorism. This risk, therefore, should be eliminated before it is realized.  
As Waltz asserts that global problems require great capabilities and 
states using their capabilities to solve the global problem do not act to create a 
global public good.230 The US is the global power with unprecedented 
capabilities. After the September 11 attacks, the United States developed a new 
                                                 
228 Schmid,  “Terrorism and the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction: From Where to Risk,” 
114. 
229 If terrorist organizations acquire the weapons of mass destruction then we can talk about a 
global terrorism because the extent of terror imposed would be a global one.   
230 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 109. 
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security strategy. The reason for a new security strategy was to avoid more 
severe attacks of the developing threat of transnational terrorism. According to 
this, the United States changed its security doctrine from ‘threat to ‘capabilities’ 
based one.231 This is a preventive understanding based on avoiding threats 
before they emerge. Therefore, the initial security and defense objective of the 
US turned out to be the prevention of its state or non-state enemies’ or rivals’ 
developing capabilities that exceed the capabilities of the US’. The new strategy 
of the US has global implications for world security.232 The target of the US is 
not only the existing enemies but also future ones. Asymmetric war, that is 
terrorism, constitutes a special place in this new doctrine. After September 11, 
the US begins to define its allies according to their position with regard to 
terrorism. The US is determined to punish the states supporting terrorism, 
especially the ones having the likelihood of providing the weapons of mass 
destruction to the terrorists. The US’ controversial war on Iraq took place in the 
framework of ‘war on terror’. Whether Iraq had the weapons of mass destruction 
is another matter but the reality is that the US developed a new criteria for the 
classification of states. It classifies states according to their position with respect 
to terrorism, which also implies a novelty for the establishment of alliances in 
the leadership of the US. The words of George W. Bush clearly indicate this 
attitude: ‘you are either with us or against us’.233 The ‘against’ category is 
composed of states trying to develop the weapons of mass destruction and 
                                                 
231 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report [report on-line]. 2001; 
available from http://www.comw.org/qdr/qdr2001.pdf; Internet .  
232 Arıboğan states that terrorism became an instrument for the powerful states that help them 
to reshape the world. Arıboğan, Tarihin Sonundan Barışın Sonuna, 189. 
233 You are either with us or against us [news on-line]. Available on 
http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/11/06/gen.attack.on.terror/; Internet. 
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having relation with the terrorist organizations. The US, distracted with the 
‘possibility’ of an unconventional alliance, is determined to take 
countermeasures before such a circumstance occurs. The US’ resoluteness in 
fighting terrorism with the prospects of richer capabilities may produce reverse 
effects on terrorist organizations. Yet, the US’ perception of threat changed with 
terrorist attacks indicates the fact that even the US would not be able to handle 
terrorism if they acquire the weapons of mass destruction; therefore, it 
necessitate to produce some preventive policies.  
In an overall evaluation, transnational terrorism by exploiting internal and 
external means of balancing takes advantage of the weaknesses in the 
international political system. Some terrorist organizations succeeded to 
develop distinct capabilities as the September 11 attacks indicated. These 
attacks gave the signals of the threat posed by terrorist organizations to state. 
States become distracted with these signals because their ways of conducting 
conflictive relations came under the pressure of change. This change occurred 
because of the changes in the increased capabilities of the terrorist 
organizations. Related to this factor, states’ already existing insecure 
environment enhanced with the uncertainty asserted by terrorist organizations. 
In the following section, we will elaborate on the impacts of terrorist 
organizations on the international system and indicate changes and continuities 
in the system.   
 
5.3 Impact of Transnational Terrorism on the International System 
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After the September 11 attacks, numerous academic and daily 
discussions took place regarding the change in the system. Waltz says we can 
talk about the importance of the transnational actors develop to the point of 
rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few of the minor ones.234 As 
historical data and observations indicate, terrorism created troubles for many 
states since the ancient times. Yet, until the September 11 attacks, there was 
no discussion on the change of the system stemming from transnational 
terrorism. These attacks indicated that terrorism succeeded to reach a high 
point in its evolution process and become able to challenge even a superpower. 
This challenge was an unprecedented one; yet, whether it is sufficient to claim a 
change in the system or do we need other conditions to claim change in the 
system are going to be discussed in the following section.  
 According to Waltz, system is composed of a structure and its 
interacting units and system level change occurs in three ways.235 First, if the 
ordering principle of the system changes, then the system is transformed, which 
means a shift from anarchy to hierarchy. Second, if the character of units 
changes, then a system level change occurs. This change implies the 
abolishment of each unit’s sameness in functioning. Third, if the distributions of 
capabilities across the units change then the system also transforms. Changes 
in the distribution of capabilities are changes of the system whether  the system 
is anarchic or a hierarchic one. 
                                                 
234 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 94. 
235 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 100-101. 
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To begin with the first condition, in order to have a change in the system, 
the ordering principle must change from anarchy to hierarchy.  Anarchy means 
that none of the units in the system entitled to command the orders of a higher 
authority. Units coexist under the conditions of anarchy. As they are on their 
own in the system, they try to assure their survival through duplicating the 
successful actors in the system. They use their capabilities to enhance their 
current position compared to others, as they are not certain about the intentions 
of other units in the system. Since they all compete for relative gains and all get 
socialized as a result of this competition. Needless to say, the major field of 
competition takes place in the field of security. 
When we consider the terrorist organizations, we can make similar 
arguments in relation to them. Terrorist organizations emerged as units 
challenging states in the field of security. They are also subject to the same 
structural constraints. They try to increase their capabilities in order to assure 
their survival. They search for relative gains. They get socialized and act similar 
to states. They make internal and external balancing. They interact and coexist 
with the other units, even though covertly, in the system.  
Nevertheless, their emergence as transnational actors does not lead a 
change in the anarchic composition of the system.  The ordering principle of the 
system remains still the same. Besides, as discussed in detail above, this 
composition of the system plays an important role in the development of 
transnational terrorism. Terrorist organizations take advantage of the systemic 
weaknesses like viruses and use states against each other to make their 
conditions better. As states cheat, terrorist organizations come up as stronger 
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units out of their rivalry. Therefore, instead of changing the system, they provide 
continuity in the system. States observing success of the cheaters tend to cheat 
and this relation goes on as a vicious circle. As a result, terrorism increase 
states’ uncertainties regarding the others’ intentions as it is used as a foreign 
policy tool.236 In this regard, we can conclude that emergence of transnational 
terrorism is solely an addition of a new actor; it is not the abolishment of the 
ordering principle of the international system. 
Second, transnational terrorism does not determinate the sameness 
principle as well. Instead of changing this principle, as discussed above, states 
and terrorist organizations act similarly in the system. Both seek relative gains. 
Both establish alliances and compete. Both have inclination towards balancing 
their counterparts by using each other’s as external means of balancing. Both 
try to increase their capabilities in order to be distinguished from the others. 
Both do not make division of labor with the other units in the system and do not 
get specialized in the area that they accomplish best. They try to develop their 
capabilities in all areas. As terrorist organizations did not changed states’ similar 
functioning, and do not lead them to get specialized, and they themselves 
became subject of this impact of the system, we cannot claim a change 
regarding this condition. 
                                                 
236 Kenneth Waltz claims that terrorism did not changed the basic principle of the international 
politic. In reverse, it enhanced the military and security concerns of the states. He elaborates on 
the US policies after the September 11 and claims that the war on terrorists enables it to 
establish bases on Russia’s southern border and to further its encirclement of China as well as 
Russia. Waltz, “Continuity in International Politics,” 350. 
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Last, the impact of terrorist organizations on the distribution of 
capabilities across the units237 cannot be calculated because these 
organizations and their capabilities are secret. Yet, we cannot deny that terrorist 
organizations have an impact on the distribution of capabilities. Terrorist 
organizations appearance as actors in the system itself implies an important 
change in the system. These organizations emerged as actors having 
interaction with other units and creating impact on their behaviors. Their 
existence is a war of having more capability to destroy. Therefore, our 
acceptance of terrorist organizations as units brings the result that there is a 
change in the distribution of capabilities and in the system as well.   
However, we cannot articulate to what extent these organizations led a 
change in the distribution of capabilities. Terrorist organizations originate an 
indefinable alteration because we cannot put terrorism anywhere in the 
positional picture. Due to the lack of certain knowledge of their capabilities, we 
cannot give a certain value and compare their capabilities with the other actors 
in the system. Normally, major units in the system are grouped according to 
their compared capabilities and structural changes can be anticipated from the 
changes in their capabilities. A change in the number of great powers indicates 
a change in the distribution of capabilities across the units. Looking at the 
change in the distribution of capabilities, we can state whether the world is 
                                                 
237 It should be remembered that distribution of capabilities across the units is a factor that is 
different than the capabilities of units. Terrorist organizations as parts of unconventional alliance 
may lead to a change in the distribution of capabilities among the opposing groups. Terrorist 
organizations as parts of unconventional alliances may constitute a change in the power 
calculations among the conflictive groups. States support terrorist organizations to spend less 
and harm more to their adversaries. If their sub-contractors’ action is successful, then the 
distribution of capabilities changes in favor of their sides. Turkey’s position with respect to Syria 
and the PKK can be considered an illustration of this.  
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multipolar, bipolar or unipolar.238 Even though, it is hard to have complete 
information regarding the powers of the states, it is possible to make some 
approximate calculations regarding their military, economic, and political 
situations. This enable states to calculate their respective strategies and enable 
them to produce countermeasures, which provide some degree of certainty in 
the system. 
Nevertheless, terrorism emerged as such an actor whose strength can 
be observed only when it accomplishes some destructive actions. As a 
consequence of this, it is not possible to make a beforehand power estimation 
related to terrorist organizations and situate them into the positional picture of 
the distribution of capabilities. Terrorism creates a hole in the positional picture 
of the system, and increases the uncertainties at the system level. This hole 
leads a change in the distribution of capabilities because it represents an actor 
that should be taken into consideration but whose place, power and intentions 
cannot be estimated. Terrorist organizations take place in the security equations 
and in the positional picture as an undefined factor.239 
Moreover, terrorist organizations try to create a radical change in the 
distribution of capabilities as their desires to acquire the weapons of mass 
destruction propose. Terrorist organizations’ have strong aspirations for 
                                                 
238 Looking at the history we can claim that the impact of the use of these terrorist organizations 
on the general distribution of capabilities across the units seems insignificant so far. Since the 
structure of the system was not defined according to one unit’s having terrorism as a capability 
and the others deprivation of it.  
239In fact, the hole that they open in the distribution of capabilities makes terrorist organizations 
serious actors in the system. The uncertainty posed by terrorist organizations on the distribution 
of capabilities across the units constitutes a change in the system. If their capabilities were 
calculated and they had permanent locations their impact on the distribution of capabilities 
across the units would be insignificant. For instance, their impact would be similar to the impact 
of an additional small state in the system.   
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acquiring more power through the weapons of mass destruction because this 
capability lead them and their supporters to emerge as independent actors who 
are immune to assaults of their opponents. Fearing from a terrorist attack 
realized with the WMD, states might not be able to pursue classical methods. 
This radical alteration in the position of terrorist organizations would enhance 
their advantages over the states and by means of the credible secret military 
capability; they endeavor to leave states in an extremely vulnerable position.  
Such a case would not resemble the situation in the Cold War era, in 
which both superpowers sustained peace through ‘balance of terror’. In case of 
terrorist having the capability, we cannot estimate the terrorists’ intentions 
utilizing the capability against states for certain. Terrorists might stop shedding 
blood with their conventional methods, as they would become more horrifying 
than before. Even though, this could be evaluated as a positive implication, we 
would need to talk about ‘imbalance of terror’. As terrorist organizations are 
secret by definition, response options of threatened states’ would be quite 
restricted. Even, there would not be options but an option that is to comply with 
the demands of the terrorist organization. Terrorists would appear as totally 
independent actors from states and would become immune to states’ 
countermeasure in classical military terms.  We need to talk about the total 
failure of deterrence or warfare as counter-terrorist measures.  
Currently, victimized states face a limited response problem, which is 
states may respond back to states providing support for terrorism at some 
degree. However, if terrorist organizations acquire the weapons of mass 
destruction, then victimized states cannot attack to supporter states under the 
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security umbrella of terrorist organizations with the WMD. States would need to 
severely consider a risk of retaliation when they perform actions against 
terrorists’ wishes.  For instance, if this scenario was real and Al Qaeda had the 
weapons of mass destruction, we should ask ourselves that whether the US 
could attack on Afghanistan or Iraq in the framework of ‘war on terrorism’ or 
whether it would try to find other means to deal with it. We assume that the 
latter option would be valid.  
When we turn to the current picture, leaving aside the scenario, we 
notice that terrorism played no significant role in the calculations related to 
distribution of capabilities across the units so far. There became no time in the 
history that terrorism was used as a measurement while defining the structure 
due to its impact on the distribution of capabilities. However, from September 11 
on, terrorism seems to constitute an important factor in the distribution of 
capabilities across the units. The attacks on the US gave a sign that well-
planned terrorist attacks may harm a superstate’s security and lead it to change 
its security doctrine.240 These attacks indicated that a terrorist organization 
could reduce the relative power of a superpower. Therefore, a relative decrease 
in the power of the sole super power might lead a serious change in the 
distribution of capabilities across the units. It is claimed that the US’ relative 
position in the world security decreased because it faced such a threat that it 
                                                 
240 Brian Jenkins claims that terrorists and their state sponsors have altered American foreign 
policy and affected the ability to implement that policy. They have demonstrated that the US has 
difficulty in striking back; they have provoked the US into taking military action, thereby straining 
relations with allies. They also compelled the US to divert increasing resources to protect itself 
and facilities to protect itself and its facilities against their attacks. Jenkins, Defense Against 
Terrorism.774 Jenkins’s arguments still have validity. After the September 11 attacks, the US 
increased its defense spending (about $48 billion) and it had some problems with its allies due 
to its policies under the framework of ‘war on terror’.   
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need the cooperation of the other states. The multilateralist241 approach 
confirmed that the US’ capabilities do not work against terrorism and leaves it at 
a very vulnerable position. As states in the system tend to cheat, other actors 
may provide support to terrorist organizations in order to deteriorate the US’ 
power position in the world. Jenkins states that states avoid developing a 
generally accepted definition of terrorism and combining their forces to defeat it 
because they consider that they might also need terrorist organizations as 
surrogate warriors in the future.242 According to this, terrorism is not eliminated 
because states want to keep is as an option to erode their rivals’ supremacy. 
The tendency to cheat assure that terrorism will remain as a means among the 
other capabilities of states and terrorist organizations will build up their 
capabilities by benefiting from the systemic weakness. Therefore, the use of 
terrorism as a means of foreign policy having impact on the distribution of 
capabilities ‘among’ several units may have further applications on the 
distribution of capabilities ‘across’ the units. 243  
                                                 
241 Kenneth Waltz claims that this multilateral approach was adopted only to meet immediate 
and pressing requirements of the US in the face of terrorist attacks.  The US needed the police 
and intelligence capabilities of the other states in order to track and catch terrorists. Kenneth N. 
Waltz, “Continuity in International Politics,” In World in Collusion: Terror and Future of Global 
Order, eds. Tim Dunne and Ken Booth (New York: McMillan, 2002), 348. 
242 Brian Jenkins, “International terrorism”, in The Use of Force: Military Power and International 
Politics, eds.  Robert Art and Kenneth N. Waltz (Lanham, Md: Littlefield Press, 1999), 76. Also 
James Rosenau claims that there will be no wars in the world after the Cold War but low-intense 
armed conflicts, ethnic conflicts, and terrorism. Deniz Ülke Arıboğan, Tarihin Sonundan Barışın 
Sonuna (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2003), 188. 
243 The author added italics. As the history indicates, terrorist organizations and states made 
unconventional alliances. Most brutal of these alliances established against the US since the 
end of the Cold War and the US became target of terrorist attacks more than ever in the history. 
And, most of these terrorist organizations have the support of states, mostly from Middle East 
origin, and they distracted with the policies of the United States. As Jervis asks why the 
Americans are hated and answers that because of the policies it followed, especially in the 
Middle East. These facts give us an idea about the future of the affairs among the states. 
Terrorist organizations and states will persist to establish unconventional alliances against a 
common enemy. As the more terrorist organizations involve the relations among the states the 
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To conclude, terrorist organizations have their own dynamics to increase 
their capabilities. They act as the other units in the system and try to increase 
their own capabilities. The transformation in their capabilities leads them to 
become more dreadful and appear as actors having transnational 
characteristics. However, the development process of terrorist organizations is 
not totally independent from the major actors of the system. States also 
contributed to the process by providing sanctuary, military, economic resources. 
Since the states cheated in the system, terrorist organizations become more 
transnational. As mentioned in the previous chapters, transnational terrorist 
organizations have their own means and their existence is not solely based the 
support of states. Yet, the positive impact of states in the development of these 
organizations cannot be denied. 
Hence, we can claim that systemic forces are effective in development of 
transnational terrorism as an actor. It became able to transcend the national 
borders of states and to threaten states from within and outside. As Paul 
Wilkinson states that in an international system which is inherently anarchic due 
to the lack of a single supranational legal sovereign, the states supporting 
terrorism are able to block any effective global effort against international 
terrorism.244 The long history of terrorism also indicates that terrorism will 
endure. Therefore, ‘the conclusion is that we are going to continue to be faced 
terrorism. Hence, the question that we face in the free world have to ask is, how 
                                                                                                                                                                                                            
more the interactions among the states will change. In the end the terrorist organizations will 
make profit out of this change in the interaction of the states.   
244 Wilkinson, “Fighting the Hydra: Terrorism and the Rule of Law”, 255. 
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to live with terrorism?’245 As Waltz states ‘the only remedy for a strong structural 
effect is a structural change’246, without such a radical change we should not 
expect a world without terrorism. Even, we should become accustomed to the 
changes asserted by transnational terrorism. 
                                                 
245 Hanan Alon, “Can Terrorism Be Deterred,” in Contemporary Trends in World Terrorism, ed. 
Anat Kurz (New York: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987), 130. 
246 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 111. 
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CONCLUSION 
CHAPTER VI 
 
“The world community is now required to deal 
with unprecedented problems arising from acts of 
international terrorism… which raise many issues 
of a humanitarian, moral, legal, and political 
character for which, at present time, no commonly 
agreed rules or solutions exist.”247 
 
Even though terrorism has a very long history, the prospects of change in 
the international politics due to transnational terrorism, became intensified 
particularly after the September 11 attacks. Those incidents gave the signals of 
the birth of a significant actor who has no definite place and identity. And, the 
compound nature of the concept of terrorism became one of the most popular 
issues debated in the academia. The problems concerning producing a general 
definition, right approach for dealing with terrorism, making typology, assuring 
international cooperation and producing a legal accepted basis for the 
judgments of terrorism, have been discussed. We also conversed some of 
these issues and reached some conclusions.  
As it is nicely put in the quotation above, the problem has many aspects 
without any general rule to deal with it due to the lack of a unified definition of 
terrorism. We also agree that the first obstacle for fighting against terrorism is to 
produce a single definition. There are two approaches regarding terrorism. One 
considers looking at the causes of terrorist acts is necessary to understand it, 
and the other claims that the means should be taken as a measurement. In our 
study, we discussed the necessity of the second approach in order to produce 
                                                 
247 Combs, Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century, 223. 
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an objective and general definition that would not confuse researchers and 
prevent the continuation of the dictum ‘one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter.’  
However, we are not so optimistic about the solution of definition problem 
because of the structural reasons. It is for certain that academic studies help to 
create a general framework, nevertheless, development of terrorism is 
connected with the practices of states in the international system. Since the 
international structure has been anarchic, the history of terrorism represents a 
long path parallel with the clashes of interest among states.  States tend to 
support, directly or indirectly, terrorist organizations that are inclined to weaken 
their opponents in the system. In another saying, terrorism takes place among 
the external means of states for a long time and they contributed to the 
development of terrorist organizations in one way or another.   
Naturally, terrorist organizations are not born just because of external 
inducement. Most terrorist organizations have domestic origins and as they got 
support from the outside they grew stronger. As it is discussed in the second 
chapter, some terrorist organizations proceed their existence, some not. 
Loosing external and internal support are the two major causes for the 
disappearances of some terrorist organizations.  We argued that these factors 
are closely related to each other. Since the external support increases the 
capabilities of terrorist organizations, terrorist organizations become more 
destructive in their actions; as they become more destructive they make heard 
their voice better; as they succeed better publication they get more support. In 
the end as they get more support they grow in the number and quality, and they 
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become more destructive again. Hence, states’ support for terrorists has a very 
crucial place in the growth of terrorist organizations as important actors in the 
system. 
Terrorist organizations as smart mechanisms not only took advantage of 
states’ debility stemming from the anarchic composition of the international 
system but also learned and adapted the conditions of the modern environment 
they coexist with the other units. They benefited from the opportunities provided 
by liberal and weak states. They infiltrated in both societies. They used science 
and technology as a compensating mechanism for their weaknesses against 
states. They aim to reach a desirable equilibrium between the cost and the 
destructiveness using technology and science. Enhancing their internal 
capabilities with external support, terrorist organizations emerged as secondary 
actors who have prospect of challenging states in the security realm.  
Theories studying transnational actors and claiming a challenge by these 
organizations to the prominence of the states in the international politics 
generally assume a competition so as to fulfill a task in a better manner. Yet, we 
claimed a very fundamental difference between the other transnational actors 
and terrorist organizations. The former group develops its capabilities under the 
control or the cognizance of the states. Therefore, if states need to restrict one’s 
functioning they do not face a serious problem in identification and producing 
response. First of all, these transnational organizations do not pose a threat to 
the survival and security of states. Terrorist organizations do not compete to 
provide a better security environment for states they insert a real challenge to 
them with uncertainty in time, place and perpetrator.  September 11 attacks put 
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a very important remark onto the history of terrorist organizations and states 
since it informed the magnitude of terrorist organizations’ capabilities. These 
attacks make aware of the major actors of the international system that they 
coexist with undefined actors whose capabilities can only be measured by the 
activities they performed.  Hence, we claim that appearance of terrorist 
organizations as indefinable actors in the system lead a change. Yet, this 
change resembles to the addition of a new state in the system. The sole 
difference of the new actor is its secrecy. It does not change the anarchic 
composition of the system. In fact, it enhances the structural imperatives as it 
increases the uncertainty and insecurity of the units about the others’ intentions. 
The new actors are similar to the states in their functioning. Similar to 
states, they differentiate according to their capacity. Terrorist organizations 
differ from each other as they cause more destruction and fear.  Like states, 
terrorist organizations also strive for turning their economic capabilities into 
military and political advantages over their opponents. In order to increase their 
power and become more fearful, terrorist organizations desire to acquire the 
weapons of mass destruction as an internal balancing process, which is also 
comprehended as duplication of the most successful states, militarily. Moreover, 
in parallel to states, they establish unconventional alliances and balance their 
opponents by external means. These are the indicators that structure also 
influence terrorist organizations and become socialized as other units. Similar 
functioning is a criterion for Waltz to claim a change in the system. As all units 
in the system use internal and external means, and get socialized under the 
influence of the structure, we concluded that system has not changed. 
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We assert that the impact of the terrorist organization on the distribution 
of capabilities cannot be calculated as the organizations are secret by definition 
and their capabilities can be measured when they undertake their actions. 
However, we argued that terrorist organizations opened a hole in the positional 
picture of the international politics. States are not capable of defining certainly 
their terrorist adversaries and therefore, they cannot pursue the classical 
methods in conduct of the conflictive relations with them. Unless states identify 
a state allied with a terrorist organization whose dependency on its supporter is 
high, methods of war and deterrence seem to fail in the face of terrorism. This 
indicates a change in the interactions of states with the other units when they 
encounter terrorist attacks. If victimized state solves the identification problem, 
then it faces location problem.  In short, identification and location problems 
avoid states defining their respective position regarding to terrorist 
organizations. These problems triple uncertainty of states in the system due to 
indefinite position in the distribution of capabilities.  
As an indirect impact of the new actor, we argued that the US policies in 
the near-term might indicate changes. As the US cannot fight the new challenge 
alone, because of the characteristics of the threat, multilateral approach might 
open a way for other great powers to have an active part in the world politics. 
The US’ spending on military may lead a decrease in the relative power of the 
US in the long term. Its involvement in the conflicts in order to take preventive 
steps against terrorism in the other parts of the world may annoy other great 
powers, and such actions may lead more terrorist operations. Most importantly, 
states may use terrorist organizations as a foreign policy tool and may strive to 
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counterbalance the supremacy of the US by this means. As a long-term 
projection, terrorism may lead the hegemon to become a great power and turn 
the unipolar world into a multipolar one or into a bipolar world in which poles are 
defined according to their positioning with respect to terrorism.  
Again, we also argued that a radical change might take place when a 
terrorist organization acquires the weapons of mass destruction. If this happens, 
the terrorist organizations’ attitude would be very crucial in defining the world 
politics. Terrorist organization with this capability would have a second-strike 
capability. Terrorists have already an advantage over the states, as they are 
secret. With their extensively destructive capability, terrorist organizations’ 
demands would be seriously considered even obeyed. Hence, nuclear-states 
should take very serious counter measures against terrorists and prevent them 
before they acquire the capability, otherwise to take action against it would be 
really problematic.  
In the end, we suggest in line with Waltz’s assertion, as terrorism is a 
product of international structure and unless the anarchic make-up of the 
system changes, the problem of terrorism will endure to decades to come. As it 
is not possible to control every single unit’s actions and intentions, as the units 
tend to cheat to be better-off by using terrorism as a foreign policy tool and 
escaping the risk of open conflict, and as terrorist organizations have their 
internal dynamics, it seems that states need to control terrorist organizations’ 
capabilities and handle the uncertainty enhanced by the increased knowledge 
about the threats posed by terrorist organizations. In short, states will continue 
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to coexist with terrorist organizations and strive for getting the minimum 
damage. 
It should be kept in mind that, structural realism as a theory helps us to 
explain continuities and some structural changes at the system-level. It does not 
propose solution to policies to deal with the subject. Therefore, as a future 
projection of this study, first, the theory of Structural Realism should be revised. 
States may still be the main actors in the international politics but they are not 
the sole actors anymore. The emergence of transnational terrorist organizations 
as very important challengers in the field of security implies the necessity of 
such revision.   
Such a revision would require further elaboration on the conduct of the 
conflictive relations among the units of the system.  If we take into account 
transnational terrorist organizations as important actors in the system, we need 
to face the weaknesses of the conventional methods to fight against terrorism. 
Validity of classical warfare, deterrence or compellence seems to be reduced. 
Therefore, a new research can be conducted on the best ways to deal with 
terrorism at structural level. Possibilities of a positive change should be 
questioned with states’ will to cooperate so as to create a public good by 
reducing terrorism.  While producing solution to the problem of transnational 
terrorism systemic factors, such as fear on the intentions of others, should be 
taken into account. The impact of these systemic factors on the behaviors of the 
sole superpower must be considered seriously. Even though Waltz’s theory 
does not tend to explain behaviors of a state, the US defines the structural 
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composition of the world politics and its actions must be evaluated at the 
system level due to possible repercussions of these actions.   
Another implication of transnational terrorism for security studies is that 
terrorists multiply the sources of threat and fear in the international system.  
Even though terrorism is an organizational action, it is undertaken by individuals 
who sometimes inflict in the societies that they will attack. Therefore, 
transnational terrorism deduces the source of structural fear to the individual 
level, meaning that persons also may constitute serious threats to the states’ 
security. Such a development would cause a radical change in the thinking 
about security, also may lead a chain of changes that would help the cease 
permissive factors for terrorism, such as cheating in the system. This might lead 
the hegemon to decide to have more control over the international system and 
abolish anarchy or create a semi-anarchic composition, which would decrease 
the freedom at the international level stemming from the principle of anarchy. In 
few words, all of these possibilities require a revision for Structural Realism 
even though the theory preserves its explanatory power at a considerable 
degree.   
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